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Plain Meaning, Practical Reason, and Culpability: 
Toward a Theory of Jury Interpretation of 
Criminal Statutes 
Darryl K. Brown* 
In one of the few existing recordings of American juries deliber­
ating in an actual criminal case, Wisconsin v. Reed,1 we observe ju­
rors struggling with how they should apply a statute in a case in 
which the facts are not in real dispute. The defendant is charged 
with felon in possession of a gun, and all agree that he has a felony 
record and owned a pistol until he turned it over to the police upon 
their request. The statute contains three elements. The defendant 
must (a) have a felony conviction, (b) have possessed a gun, and (c) 
have known that he possessed the gun. Despite the apparent sim­
plicity of the case, the jurors deliberate for two hours and acquit. 
Their deliberations include some intriguing, and perhaps worri­
some, statements. "I think we have more capabilities than to say, 
one-two-three, these are met on a very simple level. I don't think, 
as jurors, that is necessarily our role," says one juror. "Is he a 
threat to society? - And if we decide he's guilty, is that just?" an­
other asks. "What about sending a message? I'm thinking of a 
message I'd like to send to the DA's office." In the latter part of 
the discussion, jurors struggle to interpret this simple statute. "I'm 
having trouble with that word 'gun,' but I'm really having trouble 
with this word 'to know,' " says one. "Perhaps he didn't, in the full 
sense of the word, know he possessed a firearm," suggests another.2 
The Reed jury's acquittal is often described as nullification.3 Yet 
the deliberation reveals jurors engaged in an extended, thoughtful, 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton. B.A. 1984, East Carolina; M.A. 
{American Studies) 1990, William and Mary; J.D. 1990, University of Vrrginia. - Ed. I 
would like to thank Hal Krent, Errol Meidinger, Albert Moore, and John T. Perry for their 
helpful comments on earlier drafts on this article. Participants on the jury research panel, led 
by Stephan Landsman and Jonathan D. Casper at the 1997 Law and Society Association 
Annual Meeting, also provided useful comments. Additionally, I am very grateful to Profes­
sor Joseph Sanders of the University of Houston Law School for allowing me to make use of 
his empirical data on jury deliberations. Fmally, thanks to Dean Fran Conte, who supported 
this project with a faculty research grant. 
1. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986) (partial 
transcript on file with author); see also STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE JuRY (1994); CBS Reports: 
Enter the Jury Room (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 16, 1997). 
2. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1. 
3. See infra note 232 and accompanying text. 
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and - I will argue - necessary effort of statute application. Seen 
as a project of statutory interpretation, the deliberation raises the 
interesting issue of whether jurors interpret statutes in a manner 
that at all resembles the well-studied strategies of judicial statutory 
interpretation. The considerations that these jurors raise, it turns 
out, mimic concerns familiar from judges' construction of statutes. 
If jurors are sometimes led into complex interpretive debates, what 
prompts this? Many would probably respond that untrained, undis­
ciplined jurors are inclined to exceed the mandate that limits them 
to "applying the law" to the facts they :find. Yet we already know 
from the voluminous literature of statutory interpretation and from 
earlier, legal-realist insights that "application" can be a compli­
cated, value-laden, and ambiguous task rather than a rote, mechani­
cal one. 
The label "law application" obscures the complexity of the 
jury's task. The considerable recent public law literature on statu­
tory interpretation helps to clarify the creative, normative nature of 
application, which inevitably entails a degree of law-creating and 
policymaking. Law application is now widely seen as a complex, 
dynamic process informed by substantive values and contextual 
considerations rather than as a process determinatively guided by a 
methodology such as plain meaning or drafters' intent.4 This litera­
ture, however, is largely concerned with statutes in civil public law 
contexts rather than criminal codes, and it is completely devoid of 
any effort to describe how juries apply statutes.5 This is a deficiency 
4. See generally WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
(1994); WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & Pmup P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEOIS· 
LATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBuc POLICY 570 (2d ed. 1995) (asserting that 
statutory interpretation is "very much an art and very much not a science"). See also T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 20, 22 (1988) 
(describing traditional approaches to interpretation as ainiing to "excavat[e] statutory mean­
ing" through either textualism or intentionalism, and defending newer methods that take 
account of changed circumstances and values); id. at 57 ("Interpreters [of statutes] are not 
reporters or historians, searching out the facts of the past. They are creators of meaning."); 
Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Fed­
eral Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1137, 1178 & n.222 (1990) (defining "a 'dynamic' interpre­
tation of federal statutes" as one "in tension with the expectations of the enacting Congress 
and perhaps with the statutory language, but compatible with contemporary values and con­
text"); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a 
Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1323 (1990) ("Statutory 
language has no single or objective meaning. It, like legislative history, is subject to 'manipu­
lation' (or, perhaps more accurately, interpretation)." (footnote omitted)); id. at 1366 (stating 
that "there is no denying the policy component of statutory interpretation"). But see, e.g., 
ANroNIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 14-37 (1997); Antonin Scalia, The Rufe of 
Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175 (1989) (arguing for a textualist approach to 
statutory interpretation). 
5. See, e.g., EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 70-74. Eskridge urges us to study statutory inter­
pretation "from the bottom up" rather than concentrating on u.s ... supreme Court opinions. 
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in the statutory interpretation literature, but it is a more serious gap 
in studies of the jury. 
Although modem juries apply law as well as find facts, they 
rarely are given guidance in the application task, in contrast to the 
considerable advice they receive on factfinding.6 Studies of the jury 
tend to focus on its factfinding task, in part because that process 
raises issues of keen interest to trial lawyers and litigants, such as 
what sorts of evidence jurors find persuasive and what biases affect 
their findings.7 Many studies explore issues related to law applica­
tion, such as the role that norms or notions of justice may play in 
verdicts, particularly when those views conflict with the plain mean­
ing of statutes and other jury instructions.8 Yet few studies directly 
address the issue of how juries interpret legal language rather than 
trump it with compelling normative concerns or personal biases. 
Social science literature often relies on inadequate conceptions of 
statutory application to assess juries, assuming that juries either 
He also laments the "juriscentric" bias in statutory interpretation study and notes that much 
interpretation is done by people other than judges. Yet he never mentions juries. See id.; see 
also EsKRIDGE & FruCKEY, supra note 4. 
6. State and federal jury instructions convey to juries a reductionist image of application 
as rote and mechanical. They typically say no more about applying statutes than such com­
mands as "[i]t is your duty as jurors to follow the law as stated in all of the instructions of the 
Court and to apply these rules of law to the facts as you find them." 1 EDWARD J. DEVTIT ET 
AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 12.01, at 325 (4th ed. 1992); see also id. 
at 326-29 (collecting instructions used in several federal circuits); id. § 12.02-.08, at 331-48, 
§§ 15-16, at 403-545 (collecting jury instructions that guide evidence interpretation and 
factfinding). Modem juries have lost their broad authority from an earlier era to "judge" the 
law. See Sparf & Hansen v. Uuited States, 156 U.S. 51, 74 (1895) (rejecting a federal jury's 
right to nullify); JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 67-88 (1994) (recounting the history of 
jury nullification power and judicial responses to it); Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. 
Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 867, 903-
07 (1994); Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex 
Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829, 848 (1980); William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth Cen­
tury Background of John Marshall's Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REv. 893, 904-17 (1978). 
7. For an anthology of social science literature addressing jury issues that demonstrates 
the emphasis on issues of factfinding accuracy and sources of bias, see JuRIES: FORMATION 
AND BEHAVIOR (Robert M. Krivoshey ed., 1994). Legal scholars, who have drawn from 
coguitive science research for more utilitarian studies of jury decisionmaking, also concen­
trate on jury factfinding. See, e.g., Albert Moore, Trial by Schema, 37 UCLA L. REv. 273 
(1989). Co=only expressed concerns about the jury's role in the legal system, such as its 
ability to understand complex statistical or scientific evidence, also implicate its factfinding 
role. 
8. Hastie concluded that such research thus far has explored insufficiently the "role of 
'the juror's sense of justice' in juror decisions" or "where jurors' ultimate verdicts are guided 
by considerations of fairness, equity and justice." Reid Hastie, Introduction to INSIDE THE 
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 28-29 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993); see 
also Caton F. Roberts et al., Verdict Selection Processes in Insanity Cases, 17 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 261, 262 (1993) (noting that, with regard to guilty-but-mentally-ill verdicts, "the na­
ture of the psychological processes underlying the decisional effects ... on lay persons' ver­
dicts has remained relatively unexplored" and that "[w]e do not have an understanding of the 
decisional mechanisms responsible" for such verdicts). 
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"follow" and "apply" the law or ignore it to follow their own senses 
of justice, preferences, or biases.9 
Courts and legal scholars have done no better. One prominent 
jury scholar, Reid Hastie, recently noted that "[i]ntuitions ... about 
how jurors will behave have been the primary source of guidance 
for the formation and application of legal policies," especially by 
courts.10 "The result has been a reactive, fragmented, and some­
times incoherent collection of speculations about juror behavior."11 
This simplistic understanding of law application is reflected in jury 
instructions and much jury research, and it conflicts with our com­
plex picture of statutory construction by judges and agencies.12 
9. Even leading social science scholars brush over the issue of the interpretive process 
with limited observations such as "[the jury] sometimes bends the law to comport with its 
own sense of what is just, fair, and equitable. Some will argue that this is still wrong, the law 
should always be followed." VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING TIIE JURY 163 
(1986) (emphasis added); see also James P. Levine, The Legislative Role of Juries, 1984 AM. 
B. FoUND. Rss. J. 605, 609 ("Do juries generally follow the frequent admonitions of judges 
that they must apply the law as is ... or to do they ... register the public pulse .. . ?"). Biii 
see NoRMAN J. FINKEL, CoMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NonoNS OF TIIB LAW 279-97 
(1995) (discussing how jurors "construe" insanity instructions rather than either follow them 
literally or ignore them). 
10. Hastie, supra note 8, at 4. Examples of courts using intuitions about juror behavior in 
this manner include McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U. S. 279 (1987); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 
162 (1986); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 
(1972). 
11. Hastie, supra note 8, at 4. 
12. Neither do scholars address jurors' interpretation task on another common occasion 
for examining jury decisionmaking: the debate over nullification. The nullification decision, 
as traditionally conceived, follows the statutory interpretation task. That is, once jurors de­
cide what the law means and how it is supposed to be applied, they decide whether they will 
do so, or instead ignore the law to serve some other goal or value. But see infra section 
m.D.2 (citing studies by Irwin A. Horowitz finding that nullification instructions can affect 
the factfinding discussion in jury deliberations and suggesting that the factual "story" that 
jurors compose is itself contingent on the law to be applied to it, as well as compelling norma­
tive concerns). Scholars addressing nullification tend to discuss the issue in a dichotomous 
framework: juries either should or should not be able to ignore law on occasion in order to 
pursue justice that law would not achieve. Thus conceived, this discussion also skips over the 
jury's interpretation of law. 
A more subtle view of nullification, however, places such verdicts on a continuum with 
verdicts that literally and uncontroversially apply law, and thereby understands nullification 
verdicts as interpretive acts that reconcile legal rules with concerns of context, public values, 
and consequences of application. Cf. Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of 
Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1149 (1997) (suggesting that, under prevailing conceptions of the rule 
of law, some verdicts that seem to be nullification may in fact be principled decisions that 
enforce legal rules that conflict with the statute at issue). George Fletcher has argued that 
nullification is an "unfortunate and misleading" term, because it suggests "an act of disre­
spect toward the law." GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD 
GOETZ AND TIIB LAw ON TRIAL 154 (1988). He argues that many nullification verdicts strive 
"not to defeat the law, but to perfect the law, to realize the law's inherent values." Id. That 
view opens the way for exploring jury applications of law as interpretive acts akin to those 
that judges accomplish. Fletcher, however, does not develop that description, and he de­
scribes nullification verdicts as "the jury vot[ing] its conscience," id., with little consideration 
of legal and extralegal interpretive tools jurors use to overcome the strong feeling - en­
couraged by standard instructions - that they should literally apply legal rules. 
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What constitutes "bending" the law and whether a given construc­
tion counts as "following" the law - what, in short, constitutes a 
normatively appropriate application of law - are questions that the 
study of statutory interpretation pursues. Many of the cases that 
juries decide are likely to pose significant interpretive issues. Most 
cases settle before trial, so those that go to juries are disproportion­
ately hard or close in some way. Many are close only because of 
factual disputes;13 but some significant portion also pose significant 
rule-interpretation issues, which typically are difficult because text, 
purpose, justice, and other context concerns point in different direc­
tions.14 Limited conceptions of statutory construction lead to ill­
founded criticisms of juries' interpretive approaches and decisions 
because they presuppose an untenable formalism for rule applica­
tion. A more complex description of interpretive practice prompts 
reassessment of how well juries employ instructions and apply law. 
This article offers a preliminary theory of how juries apply crim­
inal rules and aims to add to the study of juries a new recognition of 
jurors as interpreters of statutes. I build this theory on new analysis 
of two jury deliberation data sets, supplemented by review of ear­
lier empirical studies. The first source is the recording of the delib­
eration in Wisconsin v. Reed. The second is a set of eight mock jury 
deliberations based on a single theft case, Michigan v. Harris. The 
tools of statutory interpretation scholarship yield insights on how 
juries resolve difficult problems of law application. This article also 
builds that analysis from empirical research in the behavioral sci­
ences, support underutilized in legal scholarship on statutory 
interpretation. 
This focus on jury interpretation of statutes, in turn, provides 
insights into a central project of criminal adjudication. Criminal 
law scholarship emphasizes at the conceptual level that criminal 
judgments are individualized assessments of moral culpability. A 
focus on jury application of statutes allows us to explore how such 
evaluations actually are accomplished at the "ground level" of indi­
vidual case adjudication. At this level we see in action the tension 
13. Easy rule-application decisions typically are so because all interpretive concerns -
plain meaning, purpose, justice of the outcome - point the same way once facts are deter­
mined. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. 
REv. 1007, 1018, 1065, 1082 (1989) (asserting that public values have less influence in statu­
tory application decisions when the text being interpreted is clear and supported by other 
factors such as legislative history or statutory purpose). 
14. Cf. HARRY KAI.VEN, JR. & HANs ZErsEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 164-66, 432-33 (1966) 
(offering a "liberation hypothesis," based on extensive research of actual jury decisionmak­
ing, that suggests that jurors allow values and norms to affect decisions primarily when the 
evidence in a case is weak or close). 
1204 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1199 
between a core"rule-of-law value - consistent application of stat­
utes across cases - with criminal law's goal of judging each defend­
ant's culpability individually. The latter requires a morally attuned 
inquiry in which finding the breach of a conduct rule is merely a 
prerequisite rather than the complete analysis. Yet reaching judg­
ments through statutory interpretation informed by broader public 
values and norms may seem to jeopardize both the rule of law and 
the democratic legitimacy of adjudication.15 
Similar tensions occur within the jury's decision. Jurors must 
interpret law in order to apply it, and that interpretive process oc­
curs in a broad context of considerations beyond the text's plain 
meaning or the legislature's intent. Juries interpret statutes in light 
of the factual context revealed at trial; the purposes to which the 
statute is being put (and may be put generally); instrumental con­
cerns such as the incentive effects of a judgment; public values,16 
common notions of justice, and social norms; and the jury's institu­
tional role in the larger justice system. 
Part I of this article sets the stage by discussing the unique func­
tion of criminal law and the special set of demands it imposes on 
the interpretation of criminal statutes. Part II elaborates the practi­
cal reasoning approach to statutory interpretation, drawing on 
sources in hermeneutics and pragmatism.17 Part III surveys existing 
social science research for empirical evidence on jury decisionmak­
ing and, in particular, interpretive methods. Though few studies fo­
cus explicitly on interpretation of statutory language as opposed to 
nullification or miscomprehension of statutes, the literature sug­
gests that juries use interpretive practices that are captured by de­
scriptions of dynamic construction and practical reasoning. 
Part IV then uses the practical-reasoning model, informed by 
empirical research, to study the jury-deliberation data. The Reed 
deliberation reveals a rich, complex process of statutory interpreta-
15. For a general discussion of how contemporary approaches to statutory interpretation 
are all grounded in a vision of democratic legitimacy, see Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: 
The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593 
(1995). 
16. Public values, as I use the term here, refer to widely held social norms that have some 
grounding in legal and political culture. See Eskridge, supra note 13, at 1007-08 (defining 
public values as "legal norms and principles that form fundamental underlying precepts for 
our polity- background norms that contribute to and result from the moral development of 
our political community ... [those that] appeal to conceptions of justice and the common 
good, not to the desires of just one person or group"). 
17. This description is well developed in the literature on judicial interpretation. Those 
familiar with it may want to' skim or skip this part, though here it serves to connect the 
function of criminal adjudication, described in Part I, with the empirical findings about juror 
decisionmaking explored in the next two Parts. 
March 1998] Jury Interpretation 1205 
tion that shares many strategies with judicial methods. Further, it 
finds the jury employing its interpretive strategy to fulfill the norm­
ative function of criminal law described in Part I. Next, I examine 
the set of mock jury deliberations in Michigan v. Harris, a fictional 
property theft case.18 Facing a different problem of construction 
and different normative concerns, the Harris juries use a similarly 
sophisticated process. Despite close attention to statutory lan­
guage, the Harris juries ·experienced somewhat less success at 
achieving a defensible judgment of moral culpability and with using 
public-values analysis. This final Part suggests a descriptive theory 
of jury interpretation of criminal statutes. Concluding remarks dis­
cuss implications of this study for criminal law's conceptual purpose 
of normative judgment, for the related, practical purpose of revising 
jury instructions, and for the future direction of research on juries 
and statutory application.19 
I. THE FUNCTIONS OF CRIMINAL STATUTES AND THE PURPOSE 
OF CRIMINAL JUDGMENT 
The contemporary nature of criminal law creates a special set of 
problems for statutory application arising from the multiple func­
tions that criminal rules serve. Criminal statutes long have been 
understood as serving two distinct functions.2° First, criminal stat­
utes announce "conduct rules" to the general public, giving them ex 
ante warning about the standards to which they must conform their 
behavior in order to avoid criminal punishment.21 Statutes tell us 
what conduct is prohibited or, occasionally, required. Second, crim-
18. Harris is based closely on Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). For further 
description of this study, see infra section IV.B. ' 
19. Although this article deals only with jury interpretation of criminal statutes, many of 
the interpretive practices are likely the same for juries on civil cases. The implications of 
these interpretive practices will differ somewhat because the civil jury need not evaluate 
moral culpability. Additionally, I focus solely on substantive law statutes, as opposed to rules 
governing such procedural issues as assessing witness credibility and circumstantial evidence, 
or rules specifying the burden of proof and presumption of innocence. Such rules require 
interpretation as well, and surely affect culpability assessment, but I have not explored those 
implications here. 
20. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 91 HARv. L. REv. 625, 626 (1984) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT 
ON GOVERNMENT AND AN lNrRooucnoN TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA­
TION 430 (W. Harrison ed., 1948) {1776 & 1789)); Kent Greenawalt, A Vice of Its Virtues: 
The Perils of Precision in Criminal Codification, as Illustrated by Retreat, General Justifica­
tion, and Dangerous Utterances, 19 RUTGERS LJ. 929 {1988); Paul H. Robinson, A Functional 
Analysis of Criminal Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 857 {1994) [hereinafter Robinson, Functional 
Analysis]; Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 51 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 729 (1990) [hereinafter Robinson, Rules of Conduct]. 
21. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 626, 630. 
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inal statutes provide "decision rules" or principles for adjudicating 
individual cases of conduct-rule violations.22 Decision rules are di­
rected at those who adjudicate cases rather than at the general pub­
lic. Although scholars typically consider judges as the primary 
audience for these rules, and prosecutors when they make charging 
decisions as a secondary audience, criminal juries also are guided by 
these rules. While conduct rules need to be clear and simple, so 
that all citizens can readily understand and follow them, decision 
rules often must be more subtle and complicated, in order to "take 
account of the complex and varied situational factors relevant to an 
actor's blameworthiness, as well as the capacities and characteristics 
of the particular actor."23 
Many defenses are easy to understand as decision rules. If we 
take the crime of assault as a typical conduct rule, the defense of 
duress can be understood as a decision rule. The conduct rule is 
violated if the defendant hits the victim, but the defendant may not 
be held liable if he was under duress to hit the victim - if he suc­
cumbed to pressure to which most people, including his judge and 
jury, would yield.24 The conduct rule is directed to the defendant: 
"don't intentionally hit others." The decision rule guides the assess­
ment of whether his conduct-rule violation is blameworthy. The de­
fendant hit the victim, but he did not do so voluntarily, in the sense 
that we construct voluntariness with regard to fair options and cir­
cumstances. His conduct in the context of the duress he faced is not 
blameworthy. Note that it is not necessary for the defendant to 
know of such a decision rule when trying to conform his conduct to 
the law. All he needs to know is the conduct rule; presumably the 
duress decision rule only applies when the defendant would yield to 
the duress whether he knew of that decision rule or not.25 
Decision rules also arise within the basic elements of an offense. 
For example, the mental elements of offenses often function as de­
cision rules; they are not necessary to formulate the rule announc­
ing prohibited conduct. The conduct rule for theft, for example, 
forbids taking the property of another. But one who violates that 
rule - who takes another's property - may not be guilty if he 
lacked the requisite mens rea, which may require knowledge or 
22. See id. "Principles of adjudication" is Robinson's phrase, see Robinson, Rules of Con­
duct, supra note 20, at 731, while Dan-Cohen uses "decision rule," see Dan-Cohen, supra 
note 20, at 627. This article generally uses the phrase "decision rules." 
23. Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 20, at 732. 
24. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 633; Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 20, at 
744. 
25. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 630-42 (discussing duress). 
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purpose when he was merely negligent or even reasonably careful 
but still wrong about the property's rightful owner. Similarly, homi­
cide rules forbid conduct likely to result in taking the life of an­
other. But the mens rea elements function as decision rules 
because the degree of one's liability depends on one's mental state; 
defendants who do the same conduct and cause the same harm will 
be judged differently depending on whether their acts were pur­
poseful, reckless, or negligent.26 
Not all mental elements function solely as decision rules. The 
mens rea requirements of attempt offenses, for example, serve to 
define the prohibited conduct.27 I will not elaborate on the com­
plexities of which elements across the typical array of crimes serve 
which functions; that work has been done well by others.28 For the 
purposes of this article, it is important simply to note that mental 
state elements often serve the key function of guiding the liability 
decision, and that is so even in the simplest of crimes, such as theft 
and possession offenses. As we will see, when jurors struggle with a 
difficult liability decision, they frequently focus on mental state ele­
ments. This typically occurs when the violation of a conduct rule is 
clear but the defendant's blameworthiness for that violation is not. 
The distinction between conduct rules and decision rules is use­
ful for understanding the normative nature of criminal law and thus 
the normative nature of the application of criminal statutes. Crimi­
nal judgments carry a special condemnation of moral blameworthi­
ness that violations of other rules - say, tort rules - do not. Each 
criminal adjudication assesses not only whether a conduct-rule vio­
lation occurred, but also whether the violation is blameworthy.29 
The terms of criminal statutes, then, are normative as well as posi­
tive; a guilty verdict is a moral as well as descriptive judgment. 
Although a guilty verdict is at bottom a moral assessment of blame-
26. See, e.g., JosHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 463-505 (2d ed. 1995) 
(describing varieties of homicide). 
27. See Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 20, at 737. 
28. See Robinson, Functional Analysis, supra note 20; Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra 
note 20. 
29. See PETER BREIT, AN INQUIRY INTO CRIMINAL GUILT 40 (1963); GEORGE P. 
FLETCHER, REnilNKING CRIMINAL LAW 395-401, 532-38 (1978) (describing "persistent ten­
sions in legal terminology ... between the descriptive and normative uses of the same terms," 
and recounting "a normative theory of guilt," rather than a merely descriptive one, that 
emerged in the nineteenth century); SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PumsHMENT: 
EssAYS IN CRIMINAL LAW 65-106 (1987) (contrasting positivists' focus on social dangerous­
ness as the basis for criminal sanction with the dominant concern with blameworthiness and 
"moral innocence," which explains mens rea requirements ·and excuses such as the insanity 
defense); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 301-46 (1996). 
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worthiness, the inquiry should not be an ad hoc one guided solely 
by the judge or jury's moral intuitions. Rather, decision rules guide 
the judgment; those rules strive, with only partial success, to insure 
a consistency of moral standards across cases and conduct rules.3° 
They also aim to limit the decisionmaker, who, after all, can dictate 
governmental control of a citizen's liberty. 
A criminal verdict is inevitably an individualized assessment of 
the defendant's character. It evaluates his judgment in choosing a 
particulru;- course of action in particular circumstances. In doing so, 
the verdict serves criminal law's expressive function of assessing the 
moral quality of his judgment, and thereby his character.31 Crimi­
nal law requires not simply that we obey rules, but that each person 
"pursue his chosen ends with a due regard for us - with a certain 
amount of maturity, disinterestedness, and perspicacity."32 We con­
. demn wrongdoers not solely for violating rules but "also for exhibit-
ing the kind of character failing associated with insufficient 
commitment to the moral norms embodied in the community's 
criminal law."33 
In making such judgments we often become acutely aware of 
the limited, indeterminate nature of criminal statutes for this nor­
mative purpose. Criminal law is always an incomplete restatement 
of morality and social norms. Criminal statutes - even decision 
rules, which refine our judgment of conduct-rule violations - inevi­
tably lack the nuance to control fully the particularized moral judg­
ment of a defendant's conduct in his specific context.34 Kyron 
Huigens argues: 
30. Cf. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HAR.v. L. REv. 1423, 1465 (1995) 
(arguing that no juror exercising practical reason "proceed[s]  every step of the way making 
highly particularized decisions - that would be impossible," and that jurors "must generalize 
from past experience"). 
31. See R.B. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: NoMos XXVII 165 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds. , 1985) (arguing 
that "criminal liability requires a motivational fault" so that criminal law punishes only those 
whose "behavior is a result of some defect of standing motivation (one might say 'character' 
instead)"); Henry M. Hart, Jr. , The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRons. 
401 (1958). 
32. Huigens, supra note 30, at 1 424. 
33. Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse - But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. 
L. REv. 127, 130 (1997). 
34. See Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 929 (discussing "the problem of precision in crimi­
nal codes"). Greenawalt argues that because "the need for relatively concise language im· 
poses constraint" and " [u]nless a formulation is to be wholly open-ended • • .  only a limited 
number of factors can be taken into account," id. at 929, there is a need for judicial interpre· 
tation, and "judges should feel less constrained than is ordinarily appropriate by the evident 
import of the words chosen for the statute" if "situations are really extraordinary," id. at 950. 
See also Kahan, supra note 33, at 129. See generally HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND 
METHon 38 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989) ("[T]he order· 
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[R]ules and standards ... are and should remain heuristic devices: 
they do not actually serve a public, prescriptive role. Having arrived 
at a rule, we ought to return our attention to the individual case it is 
supposed to explain .... [D]efenses are legislated only in bare outline, 
and ... our true object of study is the actual, individualized adjudica­
tion of a person by a jury .... 
What is at issue in the trial is the pattern of individual choices that 
led to the act and hence to the harm. The factfinder, in deciding the 
case, will accept or reject the decision the actor made in the circum­
stances she faced . . . . The jurors will accept or reject the particular 
conception of the good and the scheme of ends that led the actor into 
the conflict and to the resulting harm.35 
The tensions in criminal statutes arising from their dual func­
tions36 - and from the moral nature of the judgment they guide 
but cannot fully embody - are addressed in large part by the insti­
tution of the jury.37 Thus, the jury's task is a difficult one: to make 
individualized moral judgments through application of indetermi­
nate rules with terms that must be given· normative content from 
broadly held social norms.3s 
ing of life by the rules of law and morality is incomplete and needs productive supplementa­
tion. Judgment is necessary in order to make a correct evaluation of the concrete instance."). 
35. Huigens, supra note 30, at 1439. 
36. Unfortunately, neither contemporary criminal codes nor the instructions that transmit 
them were written with the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules in mind. 
Statutes are written to serve both the conduct and decision purposes at once; following the 
influential Model Penal Code, state criminal codes are designed largely around distinctions 
between mens rea and actus reus elements, and between offenses and defenses. As a result, 
statutes at times may not serve either function well. The key purpose of recent criminal law 
scholarship on this topic, by such leading scholars as Meir Dan-Cohen and Paul Robinson, 
has been to identify and clarify these multiple functions served by criminal statutes, and 
thereby to provide a basis both for a general critique of current codes and for code revision. 
See generally Dan-Cohen, supra note 20; Robinson, Rules of Conduct, supra note 20. This 
distinction between the parts of statutes that primarily define criminal conduct and those that 
aim to guide adjudication in response to such conduct creates tension in statutory 
application. 
37. See Huigens, supra note 30, at 1466 ("We employ juries because we place the person 
prior to the rule, because we are sensitive to the possibility that none of the rules may be 
adequate to describe justice in the given situation, and because the rules may conflict in a 
way that only human hands can unravel."); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 29, at 309-10 
(noting the assumption of modem courts that "juries are generally better at making fact­
specific appraisals of defendants' emotions," which underlie the normative judgments of 
criminal law). 
38. This task calls to mind Rawls's description of "reflective equilibrium," in which we 
check the seeming mandates of a rule applied to particular facts against our "considered 
judgment" about the proper outcome of that case. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
48-51 (1971 ). When rule application and judgment about outcome conflict, Rawls describes a 
process of mediating the two concerns until a judgment in the case yields reflective equilib­
rium between the two sources of judgment. See id. at 17-53. We can also note here the 
similarity to Llewellyn's context-sensitive description of legal reasoning and judicial decision­
making. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
221-22 (1962) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE]; see also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, 
THE CoMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 268-85 (1960) [hereinafter LLEWELLYN, 
CoMMON LAw] (describing "situation sense"). 
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The delicacy of the problem speaks to the importance of analyz­
ing closely how the jury actually accomplishes or fails at this task. 
That analysis is the goal of Part IV. To acquire some analytical 
tools for that study, however, it is helpful first to review the sub­
stantial scholarship on statutory interpretation by public-law schol­
ars, 39 who have put more effort recently into statutory 
interpretation theory than criminal law scholars. In particular, they 
have developed a contemporary understanding of practical reason­
ing as a persuasive description of judicial interpretation. This un­
derstanding fits closely with the contemporary view of criminal 
culpability as a judgment on character. 
II. JURY VERDICTS AS PRACTICAL REASON 
A. Practical Reasoning in Statutory Interpretation 
Over roughly the last two decades, public-law scholars have de­
veloped descriptions of judicial decisionmaking - particularly of 
statutory interpretation and constitutional judicial review - based 
on the model of practical reasoning. Practical reasoning stands in 
sharp contrast to more traditional models of legal reasoning. Tradi­
tional approaches start with foundational principles from which, 
through deductive analysis, one arrives at a judgment for a particu­
lar case. These approaches define successful interpretation as ad­
herence to a method. They typically posit that either the text, 
legislative intent, or the overarching purpose of the rule should 
guide application; all share the presupposition that such a first prin­
ciple or grand theory can guide and control rule application.40 In 
this sense the traditional approaches strive for an objectivism that 
minimizes reference to the context of the decision.41 They also seek 
to restrict the discretion of rule interpreters (courts) and thereby 
exclude the influence of contemporary values or personal prefer­
ences. They strive generally to minimize the substantive content of 
the interpretive process and to make rule application determinate.42 
39. While criminal law is a species of public law, it is traditionally considered separately 
from the preoccupations of other public law areas, most typically constitutional law, adminis­
trative law, and legislation studies. 
40. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 324-45 (1990); Zeppos, supra note 4, at 1310-35, 1368 ( criti­
cizing textualism and the formalist "idea that there must be a foundationalist theory to dic­
tate predictable outcomes"). 
- 41. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 324-45 . 
. 42. See id.; see also Schacter, supra note 15 (describing four approaches to statutory inter­
pretation built upon differing notions of democratic theory). 
March 1998] Jury Interpretation 1211 
A considerable number of scholars have argued that none of the 
traditional approaches effectively achieves these goals.43 More 
broadly, they deny the possibility of acontextual decisionmaking 
that ignores all considerations except relevant first principles such 
as the plain meaning of the statute.44 Practical reasoning under­
stands decisionmaking as inductive and polycentric, drawing from 
an interconnected "web of beliefs" or shared, but sometimes con­
flicting, community values and norms. This approach recognizes 
the situated nature of reasoning that includes both the context of 
the case and the community of the decisionmakers. Judgments can­
not be objectively verified as correct under this model, but they can 
be checked for both their degree of fit with the relevant conl.mu­
nity's web of beliefs and their success at accommodating competing 
concerns. Such reasoning can be understood as a practice midway 
between purely ad hoc, subjective judgment at one end and the 
ideal of foundationalist, objective decisionmaking at the other.45 
Legal scholars who have developed practical reasoning descrip­
tions of judicial decisionmaking rely on several sources for the 
model. Some trace their premises back to Aristotle's idea of 
phronesis, the quality of situated moral judgment, employing it as a 
model for reaching appropriate answers to specific cases without a 
universal or objective theory of what is right.46 Practical reason-
43. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 4, (criticizing traditional "archeological" models of 
applying statutes); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 324-45; Daniel A. Farber, The Inevi­
tability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 V AND. L. REv. 533, 
544-49 (1992) (offering a critique of formalist approaches to interpretation); Jay M. Feinman, 
Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies, 87 MICH. L. REv. 724, 724-25 (1988) ("The 
traditional analytic [description of how judges decide cases] has been that judges apply for­
mal methods of legal reasoning . . . . That response has been untenable for a generation or 
more; thus [practical reasoning] has moved to informal legal reasoning as a description of 
adjudication .... "); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HAR.v. 
L. REv. 405, 414-23 (1989) (critiquing plain meaning); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's 
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1597, 1620-33 (1991) 
(same). 
44. See RICHARD A. PosNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A M!sUNDERSTOOD RELATION 
107-09 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay 
on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807, 820 (1993); Zeppos, supra note 4, at 1349-50 
(discussing formalism's assumptions in contrast to less determinate statutory interpretation 
approaches). 
45. See Zeppos, supra note 4, at 1341 (asserting that absence of choice due to a con­
straining methodology need not be the only measure of interpretive legitimacy). 
46. See Aru:STOTLE, NrcoMACHEAN ETFllcs bks. V-VI (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., 
1984); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 323; Huigens, supra note 30, at 1454-55 (describ­
ing one who possesses practical reason as "not simply know[ing] universal truths," but rather 
having "the capacity to integrate the universal and the particular: to identify and pursue the 
good amid the contingencies of practical human affairs" and "generat[e] flexible, creative 
responses ... without relying on doctrine or ideology, without demanding certainty"). But 
see Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. -REv. 
1502, 1534-36 (1985) (arguing that the social conditions for the widespread practice of Aristo-
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ing's more contemporary roots build on the tradition of American 
pragmatism, which abandons attempts to ground knowledge and 
judgment in foundations outside of history and context,47 and from 
legal realists' understandings of legal reasoning, such as Karl 
Llewellyn's notion of "situation sense" and descriptions of judicial 
decisionmaking.48 
The practical-reasoning model draws from hermeneutics the ac­
knowledgement that decisionmakers inevitably bring their own 
"prejudices and fore-meanings"49 - or background preunderstand­
ings, perspectives, and values - to the interpretive task. "The real 
meaning of a text . . .  does not depend on the contingencies of the 
author and his original audience. . . . [I]t is always co-determined 
also by the historical situation of the interpreter . . . . "5° For 
Gadamer, "situation" implies "a standpoint that limits the possibil­
ity of vision," or more simply, a "horizon" that "includes everything 
that can be seen from a particular vantage point."51 Hermeneutics, 
and practical-reasoning strategies that borrow from it, seeks to in­
form or "fuse" the interpreter's limited horizon with other horizons, 
including those of the text's author and the text's historical ori­
gins. 52 One cannot separate application, the present situation and 
telian practical reasoning no longer exist). Practical reasoning's contemporary development 
in legal interpretation literature, however, largely ignores Aristotle's connection of practical 
judgment to the larger ethical issues of personal character and pursuit of the good. See gener­
ally Huigens, supra note 30; see also Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican­
Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 CAL. L. 
REv. 331 (1994) (criticizing legal scholars for making superficial use of Aristotle's work). 
47. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND 0BJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM (1983}; 
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989). 
48. See LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 38; see also Farber, supra note 43, at 
535-41 (discussing the connection between Llewellyn and current practical-reasoning 
models). 
49. See GADAMER, supra note 34, at 294-95. See generally GEORGIA WARNKE, 
GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADmoN AND REAsoN (1987). For a legal scholar's use of 
Gadamer, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 
609 (1990). 
50. GADAMER, supra note 34, at 296. "That is why understanding is not merely a repro­
ductive but always a productive activity as well." Id. 
51. Id. at 302. 
52. See id. at 306. This is roughly the idea of the "hermeneutic circle,'' which posits that 
because the whole can be understood only by analyzing its parts, and each part only with 
reference to the whole, one should attempt to build a more sophisticated understanding of an 
issue by alternating between perspectives of the whole and the various parts. For a compara­
ble descriptive idea developed from studies of juror factfinding processes, see W. LANCE 
BENNETI & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, REcoNSTRUCilNG REALITY IN nm COURTROOM: Jus. 
TICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CuLTURE 49-50 (1981) ("[T]hese studies suggest [that] 
the interpreter shifts among the information or sets of symbols that have been assimilated, 
the emerging idea that seems to be the point of the story, and new bits of information or 
groups of symbols. The emerging set of connections and constraints guides the listener's use 
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use for which one interprets a text, from understanding.53 Just as, 
following Aristotle, one cannot determine a right course of action 
independently of the situation, even though that decision is in­
formed by general values, one cannot arrive at a correct textual in­
terpretation separately from the context to which it is applied.54 
Practical-reasoning scholarship concedes some degree of discre­
tion and indeterminacy in statutory interpretation. Its advocates 
acknowledge that decisionmaking "involves creativity and choice 
among competing arguments and values,"55 and in that sense is a 
means of policymaking.56 While its methods are not clearly deline­
ated, because practical reasoning is more a mode of cognitive activ­
ity or practice than a method or set of rules,57 the considerations 
one weighs in employing practical reasoning are familiar. As 
Eskridge and Frickey describe the process in their study of U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions, an interpreter will look at "a broad range 
of evidence" to form "a preliminary view of the statute." 
The interpreter then develops that preliminary view by testing various 
possible interpretations against the multiple criteria of fidelity to the 
text, historical accuracy, and conformity to contemporary circum­
stances and values. Each criterion is relevant, yet none necessarily 
trumps the others. Thus while an apparently clear text, for example, 
will create insuperable doubts for a contrary interpretation if the 
other evidence reinforces it .. . an apparently clear text may yield if 
other considerations cut against it . . . . 5s 
of the vast store of background knowledge about social life that is necessary for sensible 
interpretation."). 
53. See GADAMER, supra note 34, at 307-08. Gadamer also states that 
the person "applying" law [at times may] have to refrain from applying the full rigor of 
the law . • . .  In restraining the law, he is not diminishing it but, on the contrary, finding 
the better law . . . •  [E]very law is in a necessary tension with concrete action, in that it is 
general and hence cannot contain practical reality in its full concreteness . . .. The law is 
always deficient, not because it is imperfect in itself but because human reality is neces­
sarily imperfect in comparison to the ordered world of law, and hence allows of no sim­
ple application of the law. 
Id. at 318. 
54. See id. at 312-17; see also LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 38, at 221-22. 
55. Frickey, supra note 4, at 1218; see also GADAMER, supra note 34, at 296 
("[U]nderstanding is not merely a reproductive but always a productive activity as well."); 
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 345-47. 
56. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 345; Frickey, supra note 4, at 1201 
(concluding that "formalism in interpretation ... has not governed many important federal 
Indian law cases"). 
57. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 
34 UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1616 (1987); cf. GADAMER, supra note 34, at 295 (arguing that her­
meneutics is not a " 'procedure' or method" but a clarification of "the conditions in which 
understanding takes place," which always includes "[t]he prejudices and fore-meanings that 
occupy the interpreter's consciousness"). 
58. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 352. For a refinement of the theory, see 
EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 55-57; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory 
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Generally, then,· we expect a practical reasoning approach to 
statutory interpretation to consider the same range of concerns re­
lied upon by more traditional approaches, but we also expect such 
an approach to prioritize less formally or to weigh dispositively any 
one factor. Thus, plain meaning of a text remains a primary consid­
eration that frequently will end the inquiry absent strong contradic­
tion from other sources. Evidence of drafter's intent, as well as a 
more general assessment of a statute's purpose, often exert a strong 
pull if they contradict plain meaning. So does concern with "hori­
zontal coherence" of the statute with other, related provisions in 
either the same act or other laws regulating the same topic or 
conduct. 
More abstract considerations include evolution of the statute in 
light of changed circumstances over time, and the consistency of an 
outcome with public values - widely held social norms that arise 
from, or are embodied in, sources of law such as the Constitution, 
statutes, regulations, or case law.59 Additionally, interpreters might 
consider their own institutional role, both perceived authority and 
limits to it - for example, "courts must apply the legislature's law, 
so we give compelling weight to legislative intent" - and their role 
vis-a-vis other players, such as the legislature and executive offi­
cials. 60 These more abstract concerns are likely to change an appli­
cation only if their conflict with more concrete factors - plain 
meaning, drafter's . intent - is especially compelling. 61 Practical­
meaning interpretation, then, will consider arguments based on a 
variety of concerns that inform statutory meaning, weighing each in 
light of the others.62 
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. RE.v. 1479, 1481 (1987) (arguing for a statutory interpretation 
approach that takes into account public values and the current needs of society). 
59. See Eskridge, supra note 13 (discussing public values in Supreme Court statutory 
interpretation). 
60. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 74-80. 
61. An example of such an interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court, much analyzed in 
the dynamic�interpretation literature, is the Court's decision in Bob Jones University v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574 {1983). See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 343-48. Bob 
Jones was a private, Christian university with racially discriminatory policies. Tue IRS de­
nied it a tax exemption for institutions "organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable . . .  or educational purposes." 26 U.S.C. § 501{c)(3) {1982). Tue Supreme Court, 
employing an expansively interpretivist approach to the statute, held that the university did 
not qualify for the exemption even though it was an educational institution whose racial 
policies were grounded in its religious commitments. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604. 
62. See generally EsKRIPGE, supra note 4, at 48-74. 
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B. Practical Reasoning as a Descriptive ·Theory of 
Jury Decisionmaking 
1215 
Practical reasoning should be an appealing model to test against 
evidence concerning how juries apply statutes. Jurors are not 
trained in rules and procedures and thus would seem unlikely to 
pursue a formal, deductive method. Case law references to the jury 
in forming its judgments with a community's collective conscience 
and perspective imply a practical-reasoning model.63 Further, prac­
tical reasoning relies in part on the notion of an interpretive com­
munity, and juries are groups designed to represent local 
communities and to bring local norms and "common sense" to bear 
on legal judgments. 64 Juries learn through the trial much detail 
about the factual context of their cases, and we would expect con­
textual considerations to affect their decisions. Practical reasoning 
accepts context as a significant consideration. Finally, for criminal 
juries in particular, practical reasoning suggests a realistic means of 
applying rules to achieve individual judgments of moral culpability, 
which more literal, acontextual application would undermine. 
In the analysis below, we will see that criminal juries explicitly 
consider a range of the factors weighed in practical reasoning ap­
proaches to interpretation - plain meaning, statutory purpose, so­
cial norms, institutional role - often with an eye consciously 
turned toward the normative justice of the culpability assessment. 
In short, practical reasoning describes criminal jury decisionmaking 
roughly as well as it does judicial decisions, and thus it provides a 
normatively attractive perspective for understanding jury practices 
that are now subjected to criticism as insufficiently literal in con­
struction or deductive in method.65 
63. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 
404, 409-10 (1972); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); see also Darryl K. Brown, 
The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REv. 107, 140-47 (1994) 
(describing jury decisionmaking in pragmatist and hermeneutic terms). 
64. On the purpose of representative juries, see Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (asserting that the 
jury brings the community's "coinmonsense judgment"); Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410 (same); 
Williams, 399 U.S. at 100 (same). Cf. EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 71-74 (discussing the role of 
"communities of interpretation" in statutory application). 
65. Pragmatic jury decisionmaking poses the same countermajoritarian difficulty faeed by 
judges in acts of judicial review and statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation, and 
constitutional review, is legitimate only if it is objective, foundational, and nonpolitical; 
otherwise, unelected judges - and juries - are usurping political power from democratic 
branches. Any substantive, nonmechanical decisionmaking by juries challenges the legisla­
ture that drafted the statute and the democratically accountable prosecutor w�o initiated the 
charge. Yet judicial review is justified as a check on the tyranny of the majority and execu­
tive discretion exercised against citizens. The arguments for statutory interpretation are 'simi­
lar and, at this point, familiar: not only is policymaking inevitable in applying statutes, it is 
needed to assess the fit between the general rule and the specific case and to review the 
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To begin exploring the descriptive power of practical reason in 
jury decisionmaking, first I review existing empirical research on 
jury decisionmaking and, to a lesser extent, research on other lay 
approaches to legal reasoning. This literature partially documents 
jurors' use of interpretive strategies and substantive considerations 
of the sort described in practical-reasoning theories of judicial con­
struction of statutes. It also provides insights and analytical tools 
for the subsequent Part, in which I explore jury deliberations in two 
cases for evidence of interpretive approaches. 
ill. SOCIAL SCIENCE REsEARCH ON JURY DECISIONMAKING 
A. Cognitive Models of Jury Decisionmaking 
1. Use of Stories in Factfinding and Decisionmaking 
A large body of social science literature addresses a wide range 
of issues related to jury decisionmaking.66 An important contribu­
tion for present purposes is the cognitive psychological model of 
jury decisionmaking developed over the last two decades, of which 
Pennington and Hastie's story model is the best known and most 
elaborate.67 The story model, which focuses more on factfinding 
than law application, "identifies three processing substages: evi­
dence evaluation; learning the verdict choice set; and an evidence­
verdict match process."68 During the factfinding process, jurors se­
lectively evaluate evidence and create intuitively coherent narrative 
structures, or stories, that allow them to make sense of evidence. 
Once given the law and verdict categories by the judge, jurors seek 
the best match between the story representations of the evidence 
and their memories of verdict categories. If it finds a "subjectively 
satisfactory" match, the jury renders a verdict.69 
The story model suggests that, during the factfinding process, 
jurors impose on the trial information - both relevant evidence 
and other available facts and social data - a narrative story organi-
prosecutor's judgment about that fit. See RAWLS, supra note 38, at 25-50; Farber & Frickey, 
supra note 57, at 1616-17 (noting that, in the context of First Amendment doctrine, founda­
tionalist theories result in problematic applications to particular cases). 
66. Much of this research is related to factfinding issues that are not relevant here -
issues such as how credible jurors find eyewitness identifications, or how race, class, and 
gender differences affect assessments of credibility and other factfinding tasks. 
67. See REID liAsTIE ET AL., lNsIDE TiiE JURY {1983); Hastie supra note 8. Hastie, in a 
summary of current behavioral science models of jury decisionmaking, identifies three for­
mal, mathematical models in addition to his own cognitive model. None of these approaches 
directly addresses issues of legal interpretation by juries. 
68. Hastie, supra note 8, at 26. 
69. See id. 
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zation. That story is shaped by their knowledge of similar events -
for example, knowledge of similar crimes, or similar patterns of 
human behavior - and by generic expectations about necessary 
story elements - for example, human motivations. This imposition 
of narrative is "an active, constructive comprehension process in 
which evidence is organized, elaborated, and interpreted."70 
Pennington and Hastie further claim that the constructed story de­
termines the jury's decision, and "differences in story construction 
[and final decisions] must arise from differences in world knowl­
edge, that is, differences in experiences and beliefs about the social 
world."71 
Other researchers have reached similar conclusions using differ­
ent research methods.72 Bennett and Feldman, drawing from their 
ethnographic studies of real jury trials, emphasize that jurors neces­
sarily situate evidence-based stories within a preexisting social con­
text that includes criteria for a coherent, plausible story of human 
conduct.73 "In the process of taking incidents from one social con­
text and placing them in another, the [juror] selects data, specifies 
the historical frame, redefines situational factors, and suggests miss­
ing observations. In short, he or she can re-present an episode in a 
version that conforms with his or her perspective . . . .  "74 This study 
also stresses that "background understandings" and "background 
knowledge" inevitability serve as the source for inferences jurors 
must make to interpret and reach judgments about social action.75 
Their findings describe a contextual approach to reasoning that sit­
uates factfinding within preexisting assumptions about human con­
duct. They find as well that jurors have a fairly consistent goal of 
reaching decisions consonant with notions of justice.76 This im­
pulse, we might predict, could lead jurors to explore nonliteral stat­
utory applications. 
70. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in 
INSIDE TiiE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra note 8, at 194. 
71. Id. at 196. 
72. Hastie and his colleagues used an experimental model of mo ck juries and simulated 
trials. See id. at 204-13. 
73. See BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 11. With a somewhat different goal of 
describing how criminal juries make social judgments and justice conclusions - concerns 
likely to affect statutory interpretation as well - their work also resulted in a model of story 
construction to describe the pro cess of factfinding and legal judgment. 
74. Id. at 65 (endnote omitted). 
75. See id. at 50. 
76. See id. at 8 (asserting that jurors must process large amounts of "information in spe­
cial ways that conform to the norms of justice and the legal requirements of cases"). 
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The important point to draw from these studies is their similar­
ity to the hermeneutic and practical reasoning descriptions of judi­
cial interpretation. Jurors incorporate considerations from their 
experience to situate and give meaning to the data they receive in 
the trial. While jurors' background perspectives influence decision­
making, the narratives they impose on evidence are not purely indi­
vidual or idiosyncratic. Consistent with pragmatist and 
hermeneutic premises, the narrative structures that individuals have 
available to organize factual information are those that are shared 
within a community.77 Background assumptions about social life 
and human conduct provide the basis to connect evidence to factual 
inferences and conclusions.78 
To understand and make use of legal instructions, jurors face a 
difficult task of converting the instructions to legal "categories" 
with a list of features that must be applied to the (constructed) fac­
tual story.79 Though underdeveloped in the story model, statutory 
interpretation fits in this stage and entails "reflection on the mean­
ing of the verdict categories."80 Similarly, use of stories by jurors, 
argue Bennett and Feldman, "provide[s] the most obvious link be­
tween everyday analytical and communicational skills and the re­
quirements of formal adjudication procedures," including "how 
jurors apply legal statutes."81 The jurors' reasoning process resem­
bles the inductive assessment of multiple concerns found in practi­
cal reasoning. Interestingly, it is also reminiscent of Llewellyn's 
description of the judges' decisionmaking. Through their "situation 
sense," judges assess facts with reference to "a significant life­
problem-situation into which they comfortably fit."82 Having typi­
fied a case and identified key, relevant components, they "let the 
particular equities begin to register" in light of common sense, ap-
77. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Anti-Foundationalism, Theory, Hope, and the Teaching of 
Composition, in DOING WHAT CoMES NATURALLY 342, 344-45 (1989). 
78. See ALBERT J. MooRE ET AL., TRIAL ADvoCACY: INFERENCES, .ARGUMENTS, AND 
TECHNIQUES (1996) (emphasizing attention to background sources for factual inferences); see 
also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 22-24 (1949) (arguing that facts are not found but 
are processed through a series of "refractions"); Moore, supra note 7, at 275-83 (arguing that 
jurors process information using schemas drawn from their own social experiences). 
79. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 70, at 199-200. Pennington and Hastie suggest 
that 
the classification of a story into an appropriate verdict category is likely to be a deliber­
ate process . . . .  (A] juror may have to reason about whether a circumstance in the story 
such as "pinned against a wall" constitutes a good match to a required circumstance, 
"unable to escape," for a verdict of not guilty by reason of self-defense. 
Id. at 200. 
80. Id. at 203. 
81. BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 10. 
82. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 38, at 222. 
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preciation for society's needs, "feel for an appropriate rule," and 
respect for precedent.83 Both understandings give a central role to 
nondeductive reasoning and judgments arising from the deci­
sionmaker's background experience. 
2. Interpretive Construction of Facts in Criminal Law 
Neither set of studies gives much attention to the interpretation 
of legal rules, or how application of those rules affects either story 
construction or final decisions.84 Still, the studies provide at least 
two suggestive insights. The first we have noted: jurors employ a 
situated, context-sensitive approach to factfinding and decision­
making that corroborates hermeneutic and pragmatic perspec­
tives.85 Jurors interpret the meaning of facts with reference to a 
broader social context. At the same time that they construct factual 
meaning in a reciprocal relation with their preunderstandings about 
the social world,86 they also determine the meaning of statutory 
terms conveyed by instructions and verdict choices, a process that 
further influences factual construction. 87 
Second, such descriptions of factual interpretation should re­
mind us of a well-identified interpretive difficulty in criminal law. 
Mark Kelman has noted that "[l]egal argument can be made only 
after a fact pattern is characterized by interpretive constructs," 
which he suggests typically make "a single legal result seem[ ] inevi-
83. See id. at 221-22; see also LLEWELLYN, COMMON LAW, supra note 38, at 268-85 (dis­
cussing the idea of "situation sense"). 
. 84. As in other social science studies of juries, the working assumption appears to be that 
legal rules are formal and fixed, their application unproblematic. Bennett and Feldman, for 
example, describe the jury's task as "constructing an interpretation for the defendant's al­
leged activities and determining how that interpretation fits into the set of legal criteria that 
must be applied." BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 8. Stories that jurors construct 
from evidence "produce interpretations that can be categorized easily within the legal stat­
utes that apply to a case." Id. at 10; see also id. (asserting that stories reduce "complex bodies 
of evidence" to "terms that correspond nicely to legal categories"). 
85. See, e.g., id. at 64-65. Bennett and Feldman describe a process of fact interpretation, 
in fact, that closely matches the hermeneutic-circle strategy described by Gadamer of contin­
ued reexamination from varying perspectives in order to reevaluate the whole and its various 
parts. See supra note 52. They describe jurors as "building an interpretation by working 
back and forth" among various cognitive operations and "testing the result against the other 
side's story . . .  taking incidents from one social context and placing them in another." 
BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 64-65; cf. Zeppos, supra note 4, at 1338 ("Fact find­
ing is no less of an interpretive act than statutory interpretation."). 
86. See, GAD AMER, supra note 34, at 226-71, 291-96; see also supra section II.A (discussing 
practical-reasoning literature). 
87. See, e.g., Roberts et al., supra note 8, at 262-63 (discussing the possibility that different 
verdict options "might directly influence the process of evaluation and 'construal' of informa­
tion from cases" and citing studies suggesting such influence). 
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table."88 Kelman argues that interpretive constructs in criminal law 
occur in four forms, all of which operate unconsciously or "non­
rationally" to shape our view of the defendant's behavior.89 One 
construct involves the choice of broadly or narrowly constructing 
the relevant time frame. This decision whether to consider events 
that happen either before or after the criminal incident depends on 
whether the events seem relevant to judging the defendant's behav­
ior.90 Similarly, even when employing a broader time frame, one 
may choose to take a disjointed or unified view of a defendant's 
choices during that time, allowing earlier events or states of mind to 
become more or less relevant.91 One may comparably choose to 
.construe the defendant's intent narrowly - relating solely to physi­
cal actions at the moment of the alleged crime - or more broadly 
to include his goals and the criminal nature of his conduct.92 Fi­
nally, criminal law must choose whether to view the defendant nar­
rowly - as a unique individual with a specific set of perceptions 
and capabilities - or more broadly as a person of normal capacities 
88. Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN, L. 
REv. 591, 593 (1981). 
89. See id. 
90. See id. at 593-94. 
91. Kelman offers this illustration: 
The earlier "moment" may be the time at which a defendant made some judgment about 
the situation she was in, some judgment that at least contributed to the ultimate decision 
to act criminally. For instance, the defendant negligently believes she must use deadly 
force to defend herself and then she intentionally kills someone, having formed that 
belief . . . .  
Once we agree to look at these earlier moments, we must decide whether to disjoin 
or unify the earlier moment with the later moment. We can treat all the relevant facts as " 
constituting a single, incident, or we can disjoin the events into two separate incidents . 
. . . Is a negligent decision to kill followed b y  an intentional killing a negligent or 
intentional act? 
Id. at 595; see also id. at 616-20 (discussing further disjointed versus unified accounts). 
For examples of deliberations in which jurors discussed time-frame issues - specifically, 
how much of defendant's prior life experience was relevant to his insanity defense - see 
RITA JAMES SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 140-41 (1967) (" [L]ike the 
jurors in the incest case, these jurors [in a housebreaking case] also stressed the defendant's 
behavior at the time of the crime rather than his childhood or other events in his past. • • •  In 
both trials the jurors focused on the defendant's behavior immediately preceding and follow­
ing the crime."). See also id. at 142-43 (discussing jurors' review of evidence beyond the 
moment of the crime). 
92. See Kelman, supra note 88, at 595-96, 620-33. As one of several illustrations of this 
construct, Kelman points to cases of impossible attempts. For example, in People v. Jaffe, 78 
N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1906), the defendant was acquitted of attempting to receive stolen property 
because the goods that he expected to receive had been recovered by the police. One can 
view Jaffe as broadly intending to receive stolen property, if the facts had been as he assumed 
them to be. Viewed more narrowly, Jaffe intended only to receive these specific goods, which 
in fact were no longer "stolen goods"; thus, his intent was merely to receive specific non­
stolen items. See Kelman, supra note 88, at 621-22. 
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to whom widely held assumptions about human tr.aits and abilities 
apply.93 
In the analysis of jury deliberations below, we see that jurors 
make just these sorts of decisions about interpretive constructions. 
We will also see, as Kelman argued - with reference to judges and 
commentators rather than juries - how these factual constructions 
also help jurors make legal decisions.94 Implicit in both the social 
science story model and Kelman's analysis of interpretive con­
structs is a series of normative baselines about what facts are rele­
vant to an understanding of the events described at trial.95 Those 
baselines are largely implicit in what seems commonsensical and 
plausible - the sorts of social assumptions we expect jurors to 
bring to the factfinding task, and the sort that Kelman describes as 
unconscious or nonrational. Jurors construct such factual interpre­
tations for a purpose, which is to assess culpability in light of crimi­
nal statutes. Factual interpretation and statutory interpretation, 
then, likely have an interactive or reciprocal relationship: a factual 
story will make a particular application of a statute seem obvious, 
appropriate, or most plausible. Conversely, statutory language that 
seems to compel one result in light of an initial factual understand­
ing may prompt a jury to reconsider its construction of facts if that 
initial result is discomforting - if it conflicts with a "considered 
judgment" about the proper moral assessment of the defendant's 
action. 
93. See Kelman, supra note 88, at 596, 633-42. The law must make this choice, for exam­
ple, in evaluating a provocation defense to a homicide case, for which the defendant's lethal 
response must be reasonable. No reasonable person would kill another when provoked by a 
victfui's conduct that is not lethally threatening itself, such as a spouse's act of adultery. On 
the other hand, someone just like the defendant, with his temperament, perceptions, and 
patterns of judgment, would kill, because this defendant did. See id. at 636-37. Courts have 
negotiated this unresolvable question of how particularized to make the reasonable-person 
standard - that is, how many of the defendant's traits and circumstances to include in the 
model - with a wide variety of answers. See generally Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of 
Mens Rea: II - Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REv. 
459 (1987). For a discussion of jury deliberations that address this issue, see SIMON, supra 
note 91, at 161 (concluding that most jurors in the study "seemed to feel that the ability to 
distinguish between right and wrong should have been internalized as part of one's basic 
personality" and thus held the defendant to that expectation). 
94. See Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effect of Jury Nullification Instruction on Verdicts and 
Jury Functioning in Criminal Trials, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (1985) [hereinafter Horowitz, 
Effect] (suggesting that instructions can affect the fact discussions in deliberations and that 
the factual story jurors compose is contingent on the law to be applied to it); Irwin A. 
Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Instructions, Arguments and Challenges on Jury 
Decision Making, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 439 (1988) [hereinafter Horowitz, Impact]. 
95. Cf. Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal Reason­
ing: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REv. 911 (1989) (examining the often­
unacknowledged substantive premises necessary for legal reasoning); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Lochner's Legacy, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 873, 902-17 (1987) (same). 
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B. Studies of the Effects of Attitudes, Ideologies, Values, and 
Sentiments on Jury Verdicts 
1. Attitudes and Ideology 
In light of the effect of perspectives and social context on 
factfinding and judgment processes, there has been considerable 
empirical study of "extralegal" influences on jury decisionmaking, 
ranging from demographic factors - race, gender, age, economic 
status - to social attitudes and political ideology. Many such fac­
tors affect, to varying degrees, which facts jurors remember or em­
phasize and which final judgments seem more plausible or 
preferable. While such considerations are the stock-in-trade of trial 
lawyers' jury-selection strategies, many 0correlate so weakly with 
verdict choices that they are ineffective predictors of juror 
behavior.96 
Case-relevant attitudes or ideological commitments probably af­
fect decisions most strongly. Ellsworth found in one study, for ex­
ample, that attitudes toward capital punishment, which correlate 
with a collection of views about crime and the criminal justice sys­
tem generally, subtly affect a range of small decisions that go into 
criminal-verdict choices.97 Such attitudes affect perceptions of the 
plausibility of witnesses, the availability of alternative cognitive 
"scripts" or stories for making sense of the evidence, the possibility 
of mistaken conviction, and the individual sense of how much doubt 
constitutes reasonable doubt.98 Another study found that, in a civil 
action for damages against police officers who conducted an illegal 
search, awards were affected by juror knowledge of the search's 
outcome - whether it yielded illegal drugs - by the seriousness of 
the offense, and, in some cases, by jurors' political attitudes or ide­
ology. 99 Such information and ideology seemed to affect verdicts 
96. See Christy A. VISher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 1, 3 (1987) (summarizing research literature). 
97. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Steps Between Attitudes and Verdicts, in INSIDE THE 
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra note 8, at 42; cf. Levine, 
supra note 9, at 616-21, 633-34 (finding, in an empirical study, that jury verdicts vary with 
public-opinion trends on legal norms and statute purposes). 
98. See Ellsworth, supra note 97, at 58. 
99. See Jonathan D. Casper & Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome Informa­
tion and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in INSIDE urn 
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING, supra note 8, at 65 (finding infor­
mational and attitudinal influences on jurors' factfinding and story-constructing processes). 
With regard to assessments of a search's legality, judges are also concerned with outcome 
information. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. 
REv. 881 (1991) (describing the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement as serving to pre­
vent judicial bias from search-outcome information available in a postsearch suppression 
hearing). 
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by indirectly influencing the construction of a knowledge structure 
to interpret and summarize evidence of the case.100 
Two points about these :findings are important here. First, atti­
tudes, though apparently stronger than demographic distinctions, 
have proven generally ineffective as predictors of final decisions be­
cause other factors - including evidence and trial procedures -
suppress their controlling effects.1°1 Several studies confirm that 
when evidence is relatively strong, the influence on juries of legally 
irrelevant facts as well as moderate disagreements with substantive 
rules is minimal.102 The effect of such factors increases in close 
cases, but the variation in outcomes does not substantially differ 
from those' the justice system produces without the jury.103 
More important, attitudinal and ideological biases are hardly 
limited to jurors, which diminishes their relevance for a specifically 
jury-focused theory of interpretation. An extensive and growing 
political-science literature examines attitudinal influences on judi­
cial decisionmaking, particularly in Supreme Court opinions.104 
Like attitudinal studies of juries, research on judicial ideology sug­
gests that judges' political and social attitudes substantially affect 
decisionmaking. One implication is that comparable :findings about 
juries are unexceptional. Together, the research simply suggests 
that any human decisionmaker is significantly affected by ideologi­
cal predispositions that legal training cannot suppress.105 
100. See Casper & Benedict, supra note 99, at 65-82. 
101. See JoHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 57-58 (1988) (citing sources). 
102. See, e.g., Martha A. Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Ver­
dicts, ):3 L. & SoCY. REv. 781, 794-95 (1979). 
io3. See, e.g., DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR oi: LAW (1976) (arguing from empirical 
evidence that legal outcomes consistently vary across forums and legal institutions with such 
legally irrelevant, social factors as the wealth or social status of parties); DONALD BLACK, 
SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989) (same). 
104. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND PoLmcs IN THE 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS {1983) (arguing from empirical data that judicial attitudes -
personal values and backgrounds as well as regional customs - affect decisions, particularly 
in close cases); SHELDON GOLDMAN & THOMAS P. J�GE, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AS A 
PoLmCAL SYSTEM 134-84 {3d ed. 1985); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MINo REvrs­
ITED: PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME CoURT IDEOLOGY {1974) {describing an atti­
tudinal theory of Supreme Court decisionmaking); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, 
THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL {1993); Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudi­
nal Mode� in CoNTEMPLATING CoURTS 296 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); see also GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 88-91 
(1991) (recounting blatant judicial bias in legal interpretation on civil rights issues); id. at 332-
35 (describing lower courts' resistance to criminal procedure mandates that conflict with local 
practices). 
105. More significant, attitudinal descriptions in large part may collapse into legal­
reasoning descriptions of decisionmaking. If most theories of statutory interpretation - and 
constitutional review - acknowledge substantive discretion of decisionmakers and accept a 
legitimate role for public values or political morality, it becomes difficult to distinguish be-
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2. Public Values and Justice Sentiments106 
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Several studies have examined a topic closely related to ideolog­
ical influences - the effects of jurors' notions of justice related to 
specific, factual scenarios. Finkel tested whether popular attitudes 
regarding the felony-murder rule107 and accessory liability affected 
verdicts when jurors had to apply those two rules in a death-penalty 
prosecution.108 Two points from the study are especially interesting 
here. First, Fmkel identifies a widely held value - proportionality 
- through which jurors apparently mediate the application of 
law.109 Second, he identifies instruction language that changes 
many verdicts but does not fully control them in the sense of pro­
ducing outcomes we would expect from uniform, literal application 
of legal rules.110 Thus, the study identifies jurors struggling be­
tween strong, widely held norms and conflicting criminal law rules, 
a struggle mediated by interpretation of instructions. It seems some 
jurors resolve that tension by applying statutes literally and against 
personal or community preferences; others resolve it against literal 
application, by either ignoring the instruction or dynamically inter­
preting it. The effort to define the effect, if any, of social norms on 
tween illegitimate biases and legitimate incorporation of public norms, theories of govern­
ment, or well-argued policy choices. 
106. I do not mean to imply, by the separate headings for this section and the preceding 
one, a sharp conceptual distinction between ideology or attitudes and public values or justice 
notions. I separate them only to follow the distinctions in the studies I discuss here and to 
suggest, for present purposes, a narrow definition of ideology that links it closely with 
mainstream political positions, while suggesting, with the terms "values" and "justice", 
notions that are less consciously political and more instinctual dispositions. The distinction is 
not one that can withstand much scrutiny. 
107. The felony-murder rule holds a defendant guilty of murder if an unlawful killing 
occurs during the course of a felony, whether or not the killing was intentional. See JosHUA 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CruMJNAL LAW § 31.06, at 479 (1995). 
108. See FINKEL, supra note 9, at 159-71; Norman J. Fmkel & Kevin B. Duff, Felony­
Murder and Community Sentiment: Testing the Supreme Court's Assertions, 15 LAW & HuM. 
BEHAV. 405 (1991); Norman J. Fmkel & Stefanie F. Smith, Principals and Accessories in 
Capital Felony-Murder: The Proportionality Principle Reigns Supreme, 27 L. & Socv. RBv. 
129 (1993). 
109. Jurors apparently felt strongly that just outcomes required treating accomplices less 
severely than principal perpetrators in felony-murder scenarios, although criminal law dic­
tates equal liability for them. See FINKEL, supra note 9, at 169-71 (discussing findings of 
proportionality sentiment). 
110. Jurors given a "conclusive presumption" instruction convicted defendants of felony 
murder more frequently than those who received no such instruction or those who received a 
"nullification" instruction, which informed them they had the "final authority to decide 
whether or not to apply a given law," to which they need only give "respectful attention." 
See Fmkel & Smith, supra note 108, at 148 (reprinting instructions); id. at 153-54 (discussing 
experiment results). For a discussion of similar studies on the effects of instructions, see infra 
notes 160-81 and accompanying text. 
March 1998] Jury Interpretation 1225 
rule-application decisions should remind us of judicial public-values 
analysis.111 
In their seminal study of juries, Kalven and Zeisel relied on 
judges' assessments about juror reasoning to explain verdicts that 
disagreed with decisions judges would have rendered in the same 
case.112 Based on these judicial assessments, Kalven and Zeisel 
identified several sentiments that seemed to explain some ver­
dicts.113 In one pattern of verdicts in assault and homicide cases, 
jurors seemed to construe self-defense rules liberally to expand 
concepts of adequate provocation. Jurors seemed to excuse some 
proportional violent responses to insults or other belligerent, pro­
vocative, or condemnable victim behavior, such as police brutality 
against a defendant charged with assault, or the record of abuse by 
a husband who was shot by his wife.114 The authors concluded that 
the jury's "view is not so much that the defendant was blameless, 
but that in light of the provocation by the victim, the defendant's 
punishment should be moderated."115 They found "the jury's re­
sponses to provocation and harassment are based on a delicate 
calculus"116 and demonstrate "the moderation of the jury's revolt 
against the law."117 
Drawing the comparison to Finkel's :findings, we can describe 
Kalven and Zeisel's jurors as demonstrating another aspect of the 
proportionality value. The concern here is proportional allocation 
111. See supra notes 16, 59-60, and accompanying text. 
112. Kalven and Zeisel asked judges whether they would have rendered the same deci­
sion as the jury and then - in the minority of cases in which judge and jury disagreed -
asked judges' opinions about why the jury arrived at its verdict. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, 
supra note 14, at 45. The study concluded generally that jurors competently evaluate non­
technical evidence and do not allow extralegal concerns to change decisions in most cases. 
See id. at 149-62. Yet it had several drawbacks for an exploration of jurors' interpretive 
practice. The data is based entirely on judges' views and opinions, so we have little informa­
tion directly from juries other than the verdict There is insufficient consideration of factors 
other than juror sentiments, such as the quality of lawyering, that may have affected case 
outcomes, and jury instructions are not recounted nor considered closely in the explanation 
of verdicts. For related criticisms of the study, see Gu!NfHER, supra note 101, at xviii-x:xi. 
113. Some appeared to be simply incidents of bias that would be difficult to fit into any 
normatively defensible theory of adjudication. Sympathy or dislike for defendants, for exam­
ple, seemed to affect a small percentage of those cases in which the judge and jury disagreed. 
See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 214-18; HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 135 
(noting that Kalven and Zeisel found sympathy to be a factor in only four percent of trials). 
Subsequent research, however, has not consistently found significant sympathy effects. See 
HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 134; Francis C. Dane & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Effects 
of Defendants' and Victims' Characteristics on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE 
CoURTROOM 83 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982). 
114. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 221-41. 
115. Id. at 240. 
116. Id. at 231. 
117. Id. at 229. 
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of blame between defendant and victim, rather than between multi­
ple defendants. In these cases as well, jurors appear to aim for a 
morally nuanced verdict - often by rendering a verdict for a lesser­
included offense· as a compromise between acquittal and literal ap­
plication of the principal statute - that takes account of the vic­
tim's contributory fault or assumption of risk.11s 
Moreoyer, the use of such a proportionality value can be under­
stood as an interpretive device to achieve the individualized assess­
ment of culpability that is the underlying purpose of criminal 
adjudication. A crucial tool for judging a defendant's conduct is to 
compare it not only to what we expect from ourselves and others in 
that situation, but also - at least implicitly, and perhaps even un­
consciously - to what others do in situations the criminal law iden­
tifies as related. Criminal law categorizes together as intentional 
homicides, for example, both the act of euthanasia committed by a 
nurse upon a consenting, terminally ill patient and a paradigmatic 
robbery-murder of a stranger. We should expect some difference in 
judgments of the degree of moral culpability between such dispa­
rate cases, even under the same legal rule, and expect that rule in­
terpretation will be informed by such strong background 
understandings as the proportionality sentiment.119 That effect may 
not differ in kind from judges' use of background norms when en­
gaged in statutory interpretation as well as constitutional review.120 
Just as, under a dynamic or practical-reasoning analysis of judi­
cial interpretation, statutes are less likely to be applied according to 
their common-sense meaning when other considerations point to­
ward alternate readings, strong conflicts between plain meaning 
and widely held popular notions of fairness relating to criminal 
judgments are likely sources for dynamic interpretation of instruc­
tions by juries. Robinson and Darley recently have documented 
several contexts in which popular notions about what legal rules are 
or should be depart from common law rules or contemporary crimi­
nal codes.121 They found, for example, that most of their survey 
118. See id. at 242-57. Victims who were reckless or intoxicated, for example, often 
moved juries to acquit a defendant or convict him of a lesser charge. See id. at 254-57. 
119. Cf. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 29, at 309, 313-14 (assessing the moral quality of 
each defendant's motivating emotions to distinguish between two defendants who killed with 
a claim of provocation). 
120. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 56-62 (discussing the use of norms in statutory 
interpretation); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreward: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1979) (discussing the use of public values in constitutional 
review). 
121. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JusnCE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: 
CoMMUNITY Vll}WS AND THE CruMINAL LAw 13-51 (1995). 
March 1998] Jury Interpretation 1227 
respondents - like Finkel's mock jurors - would assign less liabil­
ity to accomplices than principal perpetrators, in contrast to most 
criminal codes.122 Across a range of criminal law issues, including 
the role of harm and renunciation in attempts and failures to res­
cue, 123 they found that subjects - just as Kalven and Zeisel de­
tected among real jurors - make "more nuanced distinctions 
between similar but not identical cases" than criminal codes do.124 
The tension between popular notions and rules could be good news 
if popular distinctions are made for defensible reasons. It shows 
that individualized assessments of moral culpability, sensitive to cir­
cumstances and background norms, are not only a theoretical goal 
of criminal law; they are also part of the popular understanding of 
criminal law's purpose. 
The results of Robinson and Darley's study do not mean people 
vote for personal outcome preferences when they become jurors.125 
Assigned the role of juror, one may feel a stronger obligation to 
ignore personal sentiments and apply the legal rules conveyed 
through instructions fairly literally.126 On the other hand, perhaps 
122. See id. at 41-42. For a similar finding in a mock-juror study, see FINKEL, supra note 
9, at 154-71. 
123. Robinson and Darley's subjects gave weight to whether harm occurred, thus punish­
ing criminal attempts less severely than completed offenses and allowing a renunciation de• 
fense for attempts that were nearly complete and for which most codes ·allow no such 
defense. They also detected clear community sentiment for a rule requiring a higher thresh­
old for attempt liability than the prevailing rule - that is, the actor must be in "dangerous 
proximity" of completing the crime rather than merely taking a "substantial step" toward 
completion. Additionally, subjects supported liability for failing to rescue others in distress, 
though most codes impose no such liability. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 121, at 13-
51. 
124. See id. at 50. Al> part of that inclination toward fine-tuned judgments, respondents 
also supported grading of offenses on a long continuum that distinguishes between offenses 
even more finely than the eight or nine grades of offenses now typical in most codes. See id. 
at 198. 
125. The purpose of Robinson and Darley's study primarily was to identify popular con­
sensus about the appropriate content of legal rules, which rule drafters could use to inform 
their revision of rules. See id. at 215. 
126. We see strong evidence of this feeling in the Harris juries, discussed infra at section 
N.B. For discussion of evidence that jurors feel constraints to their authority and discretion 
when serving as jurors, see, e.g., GUINTHER, supra note 101, at SS; liANs & VIDMAR, supra 
note 9, at 154-57 (reviewing research, concluding that "[d]epartures [from instructions] oc­
curred predominantly in those cases where the evidence itself was ambiguous or contradic­
tory," and quoting one juror who felt compelled to follow instructions against her personal 
preferences and who noted that " 'the way the judge charged us, we had no choice,' that 
'personal views don't count,' and that she 'was in full agreement with the defendants until we 
were charged by the judge' " (quoting JESSICA M:rrFoRD, THE TRIAL OF DocroR SPOCK 
(1969))); SIMON, supra note 91, at 163-70; Robert W. Balch et al., Socialization of Jurors: 
Voir Dire as a Right of Passage, 4 J. CRIM. JuST. 271 (1976); Diane L. Bridgeman & David 
Marlowe, Jury Decision Making: An Empirical Study Based on Actual Felony Trials, 64 J. 
APPLIED PsYCHOL. 91, 98 (1979), reprinted in JURIES: FORMATION AND BEHAVIOR, supra 
note 7, at 91, 98. 
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instructions conflict so strongly with notions of just outcomes that 
jurors do allow popular sentiments to lead them to implausible in­
terpretations of statutes.127 Two points remain for exploration: evi­
dence of legal-reasoning approaches employed by nonlawyers in 
the justice system, and the effect that instructions have on jury 
decisions. 
C. Lay Approaches to Legal Reasoning 
Studies of how people without legal training behave in courts as 
parties, advocates, and judges suggest insights on how jurors may 
construe and apply legal rules. John Conley and William O'Barr 
studied lay litigants in small-claims courts, where some judges are 
also nonlawyers.128 Their extensive, qualitative study of litigants 
and judges' discourse in the litigation context revealed several in­
teresting features of lay ideas, strategies, and thought processes 
about laW. Conley and O'Barr divided litigants descriptively into 
two broad groups along a "rules-relationships continuum."129 Liti­
gants nearer the relational end of the continuum understand and 
describe their disputes in terms of social relationships and mutual 
obligations; their accounts downplay individual autonomy and con­
trol over events and emphasize the context and social networks in 
which disputes arise. They seek to resolve disputes with reference 
to contextualized social rules rather than literal application of legal 
rules.13o "Rule-oriented" litigants, in contrast, take a more legalis­
tic, contractual approach to dispute description and resolution that 
more closely matches formal notions of legal process. They view 
law as a set of clear rules that allocates responsibility regardless of 
status and context; they view society as "a network not of relation­
ships, but of contractual opportunities that each individual has the 
power to accept or reject on a case-by-case basis."131 
Despite the contrast between relational litigants' contextual ori­
entation and the dominant view of law as a deductive process em­
ploying sets of rules, relational litigants "are not illogical in the 
sense of reacting to problems in an unstructured or random fashion. 
Their reasoning is indeed systematic, but their logic is so different 
127. See GUINTHER, supra note 101, at 58 (noting that, while "people don't forget their 
prejudices just because they become jurors, events within the trial and deliberation processes 
act as reductive factors," including "(t]he solemn oath that all jurors take to be impartial"). 
128. See JoHN M. CoNLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RuLES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: 
THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990). 
129. See id. at 58. 
130. See id. 
131. Id. at 59. 
March 1998] Jury Interpretation 1229 
from the law's as to be largely imperceptible to those in whom the 
tradition of formal legal analysis is deeply ingrained. "132 
Moreover, Conley and O'Barr found similar distinctions among 
small-claims court judges.133 Some were lawyers, while others had 
only brief training designed for small-claims court judges. Neither 
sort of training suppressed variations in judges' views of rules or the 
relevance of context, relationships, and norms.134 Three of the 
study's judicial "types" are most relevant here.135 "Strict adherent" 
judges "view[ ] the law as a set of inflexible neutral principles" and 
their judicial role as "nondiscretionary application of the abstract 
rules and principles that constitute the law."136 "Authoritative deci­
sion makers" are similarly firm in their belief that they follow the 
law, but they "emphasize their personal responsibility for deci­
sions" and "give no indication that there is any source of legal au­
thority beyond their personal opinions."137 In contrast, the "law 
132. Id. at 60. This contextual approach is comparable to the story construction strategies 
that jurors typically employ. See BENNEIT & FELDMAN, supra note 52, at 49-61, 71-73 (iden­
tifying "interpretive rules" that jurors use to construct a coherent story from evidence and 
identify a central point for that story that builds on background knowledge and 
understandings). 
133. See CoNLEY & O'BARR, supra note 128, at 85-112. 
134. See id. at 111-12 ("[W]e have attempted to dismantle the stereotype of 'the judge' as 
impassive arbiter. We have shown that informal court judges are highly variable in their 
conceptions of law, their views of their role, and their approaches to problem solving. Much 
of this variation can be explained in terms of the rules-relationships continuum we developed 
in reference to litigants."). 
135. The two other types of judges are the "mediators," who try to avoid ruling at all by 
instead encouraging or nearly coercing settlements, see id. at 90-96, and the "proceduralists," 
who "place high priority on maintaining procedural regularity" and "rarely, if ever, interject 
themselves personally into cases by seeking to mediate or encouraging extralegal com­
promises," id. at 101. 
136. Id. at 85. 
137. Id. at 96. They also "often express critical opinions about the in- and out-of-court 
behavior of the parties," id. at 96, entertaining the sort of considerations that, if made by 
juries, would be cited as evidence of improper, extralegal reasoning. The authors cite a sam­
ple passage of such reasoning and commentary by one judge. The plaintiffs had purchased a 
used refrigerator with a warranty from the defendant. The refrigerator quickly broke, caus­
ing food spoilage. The plaintiffs had the appliance repaired by another for $50 and sought a 
refund for the refrigerator plus reimbursement for lost food. The judge explained his judg­
ment of awarding the plaintiffs only the $50 repair fee as follows: 
Okay, I'm not satisfied that . . .  that is something that he should be responsible for at this 
point. Um, you know I think he's got a right to try to come out and fix it and if some­
thing there is wrong. But when something goes wrong and you lose the food, that's not, 
I don't believe that's part of the guarantee. The guarantee is to come out and fix it. 
Your refrigerator can go wrong. A new one can go bad. Um, I'm going to award you 
the $50 right here. I think you did the right thing by, by giving him a chance and then 
going on and getting somebody else to fix it . . . .  
Id. at 97. The authors note that the judgment "contains no reference to a body of law that 
guides . • .  [the judge's] decision making," that the judge "responds in the first person . . .  
thereby personalizing the dispute between the plaintiff and the court," and that he offers 
"gratuitous, if favorable, assessments about the conduct of the plaintiff'' and thereby "steps 
beyond the bounds of making a legal decision to evaluate and comment on the behavior of 
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maker" is a judge. who "views the law not as a constraint, but as a 
resource" and "renders judgments consistent with his or her sense 
of fairness and justice. "138 The variation in approaches to law thus 
appears even among those with judicial experience and legal 
training.139 
In light of such evidence, we can expect that nonlawyers would 
bring similar orientations toward the law with them when they 
enter the jury room; th� jury deliberations examined in the next 
Part confirm this expectation. Some jurors may be rule-oriented 
and attempt to apply instructions in a quasi-formalist manner famil­
iar to lawyers. Others, however, may attempt to employ rules in a 
more contextualized assessment of the case and reach a verdict that 
accords with shared notions of social obligations and responsibility 
as well as or instead of applicable rules.140 The contextualized ap­
proach of this latter group of jurors raises the concern about the 
displacement of rules with personal notions of justice. Such jurors 
- like authoritative judges - may deliberate with more personal 
references to themselves and to litigants and cite more extralegal 
considerations; some - like law-making judges - may strive to 
reconcile rule application with strongly felt justice norms. 
Traditional understandings of law application and of the jury's 
proper role implicitly prefer rule-oriented thinkers and lead to mis­
givings about relational jurors. The latter group, however, may in 
fact be reasoning just as "legally" as rule-oriented jurors. Interpret­
ing rules with a contextualized assessment of social relationships 
and obligations is a normatively legitimate form of understanding 
and applying law that judges have widely employed, and scholars 
have endorsed, in recent years. The discussion of practical reason-
the litigants." Id. at 98. In other cases, such commentary revealed how the judge "believes 
that the people who bring their troubles to his court ought to reform their lives." Id.; cf., e.g., 
VISher, supra note 96, at 3-4, 12-14 (discussing "extralegal" influences on jury 
decisionmaking). 
138. CoNLEY & O'BARR, supra note 128, at 87. 
139. That should not be surprising. Legal scholars' long-running debates over proper 
approaches to judicial review and statutory application demonstrate comparable variations. 
See e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40 (discussing and criticizing several prominent ap­
proaches to statutory interpretation); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Concep­
tions of Constitutional Interpretation, 17 VA. L. REv. 669 (1991) (discussing various 
approaches to judicial review); Zeppos, supra note 4 (discussing and criticizing approaches to 
statutory interpretation). 
140. It would be interesting to classify mock jurors in such studies as Fmkel's using a rule­
oriented/relational distinction. See FINKEL, supra note 9, at 154-71; supra text accompanying 
notes 129-31. It may well be that those jurors who declined to treat accomplices the same as 
principals in the felony-murder scenario are disproportionately relational, contextual think­
ers, while those who applied the statutes literally, perhaps despite conflicts with strong justice 
sentiments, may be mostly rule-oriented. 
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ing in public-law scholarship is one obvious example.141 But the 
relational approach is familiar to private-law judges and scholars as 
well.142 The trend in contract and tort law has been toward taking 
account of the inevitable complexities in social relationships found 
in business contracts and dealings and away from a narrower, inore 
literal rule application that discounts context and social norms.143 
We might view relational thinkers on juries as fitting within this ju-
dicial practice.144 
· 
We need to assess juror decisionmaking with an analysis more 
complex than simply asking whether they literally apply statutes. 
We need to compare jurors' approaches with actual judicial practice 
in order to assess whether contextualized, relational approaches to 
rule application are normatively appropriate within contemporary, 
postformalist traditions of law interpretation. 
D. Studies of Whether Jurors Follow Instructions on Law 
1. A Note about Jury Comprehension of Rules and Instructions 
Social science research has demonstrated that jurors do not con­
sistently apply jury instructions literally. One explanation for these 
findings is that jurors simply do not understand the instructions.145 
They may not remember rules or statutory elements they are given 
through instructions, and they may misunderstand rules of which 
they have some memory, particularly if they have strong preconcep-
141. See Eskridge, supra note 13, at 1017-18, 1063. 
142. See JAy M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE §§ 7.1-.5 (1995) (tort law); IAN 
MAcNEIL, THE NEw SoCIAL CoNTRAcr 10-35 (1980) (contract law). 
143. See FEINMAN, supra note 142, §7.3.1-.3.2, at 192-95. As Feinman notes: 
The fundamental policy orientation of the relational approach is that the intertwined 
aspects of relationships carry with them responsibilities that persons in the relationships 
owe to one another. People in relationships and relational networks are interconnected; 
their interconnectedness means that they must attend to one another's interests at the 
same time that they protect their own interest. These relational responsibilities often 
should be enforced by legal rules. 
Id. § 7.3.2, at 194. 
144. We also may understand relational thinkers as employing in part a strong version of 
Rawls's process of reflective equilibrium, in as much as they double-check rule application 
with considered notions of just outcomes and employ a contextual analysis in attempts to 
reconcile the two. See RAWLS, supra note 38, at 48-51. 
145. See AMmAM EL WORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 3-24 
(1982); HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 121-24; Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes 
Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 159, 170-75 (1994); Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. 
Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 
17 L. & SoCY. REv. 153 (1982). 
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tions about the alleged crime.146 Such .findings seem to pose obvi­
ous problems for acceptable jury interpretation of statutes. 
Despite its seriousness, juror miscomprehension is a problem 
largely separate from jury rule interpretation. This is because, first, 
the methodology used in some studies likely exaggerates the 
amount of miscomprehension, and, more important, the blame for 
jurors' lack of understanding lies to a significant extent with courts 
rather than juries. 
On the first point, some of the studies that identify juror misun­
derstanding of statutes survey jurors individually at some point af­
ter they have been instructed and :find significant errors in retention 
and comprehension by individuals.147 Yet, as Hastie has argued and 
supported with data, juries as a group likely understand instructions 
better than any single member does. Hastie's study of a large set of 
mock juries found jury memory averaged slightly over eighty per­
cent for information from judge's instructions, if one credits a jury 
with recall of information that any one juror remembers.148 He also 
documented significant correction of jurors' legal errors by other 
jurors during deliberations, a factor other studies did not explore.149 
Moreover, Hastie's :findings are based on juries that received in­
structions in a manner now known to limit comprehension: jurors 
received instructions only once, and only orally from the judge.1so 
Second, courts could substantially improve jury comprehension 
of instructions with two sorts of changes: rewriting them to reduce 
complexity and legal terminology and improving the manner in 
which instructions are presented. Traditionally, jurors receive in­
structions orally from the judge at the end of trial, and often cannot 
146. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 67, at 168-72; Severance & Loftus, supra note 145, at 
157-61, 194 (discussing studies); Vicki L. Smith, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: 
Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 507, 509-11 (1993). 
147. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 67, at 80-81, 88-89, 168-70; see also ELWORK ET AL., 
supra note 145, at 3-24 (discussing problems with jury instructions in general). 
148. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 67, at 81. 
149. See id. at 80-81 (noting that individual jurors answered questions on instructions 
with 30% acccuracy, but a "more meaningful examination of memory" found the jury's col­
lective memory of instructions was over 80% accurate); see also FINKEL, supra note 9, at 283 
(discussing empirical studies "show[ing] that jurors do not ignore or willfully disregard in­
structions but that they remember and comprehend them"). Correction of jurors' misunder­
standing of instructions by other jurors repeatedly occurs in the set of eight Harris mock jury 
deliberations discussed infra section IV.B. See, for example, Transcript of Harris Jury No. 2, 
at 9-11 (on file with author), in which other jurors try to correct Juror 2's incorrect under­
standing of the law. 
150. See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 67, at 17, 49-50, 169; see also id. at 231 (recom­
mending that jurors be given written copies of instructions and instructed more than once on 
key rules). 
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take written notes.151 Studies indicate comprehension could sub­
stantially improve if jurors received written copies of instructions to 
take to the jury room, if they received key instructions at the start 
as well as the end of the trial, and if instructions were written in 
shorter sentences using fewer arcane terms.152 Further, there is evi­
dence that jurors misunderstand instructions defining crimes be­
cause the definitions conflict with lay preconceptions of what acts 
and circumstances constitute those crimes.153 Research indicates as 
well that properly crafted instructions can largely correct this ten­
dency and improve jurors' understanding of crime definitions.154 
Without such reforms, we cannot assess juror capacit)r to under­
stand and correctly apply instructions given optimum opportunity, 
151. See, e.g., ARTiiUR D. AUSTIN, CoMPLEX LITIGATION CoNFRoNTS THE JURY SYSTEM: 
A CASE STUDY 55-65 (1984) (discussing juror comprehension of instructions in a case that 
was tried to two juries because the first jury hung, with only the second jury receiving written 
copies of the instructions and pretrial, verbal instructions); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 6, 
at 91 (describing "judges' furious, quick-paced, jargon-laced set of instructions" to juries). 
152. See AuSTIN, supra note 151, at 60-65 (noting that the instructions in the case under 
study averaged 102 words per sentence, while modem American prose averages 21 words, 
and were written at a "sixteenth grade level" requiring graduate education to comprehend 
fully); ELWORK ET AL., supra note 145, at 3-24, 35-56; HAsnE ET AL., supra note 67, at 231; 
Raymond W. Buchanan et al., Legal Communication: An Investigation into Juror Compre­
hension of Pattern Instructions, CoMM. Q., Fall 1978, at 31, 32-35 (finding that jurors given 
pattern instructions show better comprehension of law than uninstructed subjects); Robert P. 
Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic 
Study of Jury Instructions, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 1306 (1979) (finding improved comprehension 
when instructions are rewritten); Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quan­
tified Definitions of Standards of Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 159 (1985) (finding that 
mock jurors' decisions are affected by changes in burden-of-proof instructions); Vicki L. 
Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instructions on Jurors' Information Processing and Decision Mak­
ing, 76 J. APPLIED PsYCHOL. 220 (1991) (finding that instructing jurors before as well as after 
trial improves juror comprehension); Smith, supra note 146, at 510, 533 (reviewing research 
literature and reporting results of an experiment with a revised instruction that "produced 
remarkable improvements" in mock jurors' use of legal categories rather than lay concep­
tions of crime elements). 
153. See Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Con­
cepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. 857 (1991); Smith, supra note 146. As an exam­
ple of such preconceptions, Smith's research indicates that lay notions of kidnapping 
occasionally assume that the crime requires a ransom demand, that the motive must be 
money, or, in the case of child victims, that the motive arise from the context of a custody 
battle. See Smith, supra, at 861 tbl. 1.; Smith, supra note 146, at 529-30. 
154. See Smith, supra note 146, at 533 (finding that test instructions designed to correct 
erroneous preconceptions of crime definitions "produced remarkable improvements" and 
are "a promising way of improving decision accuracy"). 
Further, as noted above, juries seem to perform better collectively, by correcting individ­
ual errors, than studies of isolated mock jurors - such as Smith's studies, see Smith, supra­
note 153; Smith supra note 146 - would predict. While individual jurors may incorrectly 
recall evidence or legal rules, collectively a jury has near total recall of both. See supra notes 
147-49 and accompanying text; see also HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 9, at 121 ("[T]he jury 
decision really derives from the deliberation of twelve people. Any lack of comprehension 
on the part of individual jurors may be corrected through group discussion."). Thus, it may 
be that group deliberations would suppress the effect of juror preconceptions about criminal 
statutes found by Smith just as it can fill in the gaps in the memories of individual jurors. 
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nor draw conclusions about jurors' interpretive deficiencies sepa­
rate from those caused by current instruction practices.155 
Whatever a jury's capacity with regard to law application, con­
siderable evidence suggests that jurors are conscientious about and 
committed to following instructions and correctly applying rules, 
and they believe they understand most instructions.156 More impor­
tant, the largest studies of real and mock jury trials find that jurors 
reach the result that lawyers and judges consider correct an over­
whelming majority of the time.157 Thus, despite evidence of mis­
comprehension, jurors' attempts to follow instructions are often 
generally successful.158 They appear to understand, as a group, 
enough of the law usually to render acceptable verdicts.159 
2. Effects of Instructions on Juror Decisions 
Several studies employing mock jurors have demonstrated that 
jury instructions have significant effects on verdicts, leading jurors 
155. Fmally, one must bear in mind the realistic standard to which jurors should be held. 
The issue is not whether jurors achieve perfect recall and comprehension of instructions, but 
whether, within a set of procedures that maximizes their abilities, they compare sufficiently 
well to trial judges who perform similar tasks of statutory application. Most lawyers would 
probably assume that judges with law degrees, practical experience, and access to law librar­
ies are superior interpreters of legal rules. But I suspect empirical data might prove surpris­
ing in a study comparing the comprehension of judges and jurors, especially in the lower tiers 
of state courts where most jury trials occur and judges are selected by election rather than 
professional merit, face considerable case-load pressures that limit research time and often 
require immediate rule-application decisions, have minimal or no law clerk support, preside 
over areas of law in which they have no practical experience, and face an array of pressures 
or incentives arising from their institutional setting that may influence discretionary choices. 
For a discussion of judicial competence, see GUINTHER, supra note 101, at xix (citing surveys 
of attorneys about judicial competence in federal and state courts). 
156. See id. at 59 (concluding, based on new studies and a review of research, that "jurors 
generally attempt to follow all . . .  instructions the judge gives them"); id. at 73 (finding that 
most jurors surveyed "believed they understood 'niost' of what the judge told them about the 
law, and they might not be wrong"); id. at 89 (reporting that 46% of jurors said the law given 
by the judge was the most important factor in their decisions); id. at 100 (reporting a survey 
of civil trial attorneys that found more than 90% agreed that jurors had grasped legal issues 
well); cf. id. at 83 (reporting survey results finding that most jurors thought their fellow jurors 
took their duties seriously). But see id. at 88, 99 (noting studies that find jurors discuss topics 
the judge told them to ignore, such as insurance in civil trials, with such factors intruding 
more often when evidence is close or the correct verdict unclear, but concluding that the 
impact of such "irrelevancies" is minimal). 
157. See GUINTHER, supra note 101, at 73; HASTIE ET AL., supra note 67, at 59-60 (finding 
most mock juries in a homicide trial reached a verdict of second-degree murder - the cor­
rect verdict, in the lawyers' opinions - with manslaughter, the next most plausibly correct 
choice, occurring as the second most common verdict); KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 
429-30 (finding nine percent of jury verdicts clearly incorrect). 
158. See, e.g., HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 9; Bridgeman & Marlowe, supra note 126, at 
97-98 (concluding that " 'the jury by and large does understand the case and get it straight, 
and . . .  the evidence itself is a major determinant' " (quoting KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 
14, at 162)); Myers, supra note 102, at 781. 
159. See GUINTHER, supra note 101, at 102. 
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to decisions different from ones they would reach with different in­
structions or none at all. As one example, Greenwald studied juror 
acceptance of self-defense claims based on battered woman's syn­
drome (BWS) when the threat to the defendant was not immediate 
and physical but arose instead from long-term patterns of abuse.16° 
Mock jurors who received a broad "psychological" self-defense in­
struction returned a substantially higher percentage of not-guilty 
verdicts based on the BWS defense than jurors who received a 
traditional "physical" self-defense instruction or none at all.161 The 
study also provides strong evidence that instructions on substantive 
criminal law significantly affect jurors. Jurors understand instruc­
tions sufficiently for legal rules to prompt verdict decisions that dif­
fer from their uninstructed sentiments. 
Sanders and Colasanto reported similar constraining effects of 
instructions. Using the same data set analyzed in section IV.B,162 
they tested the effects of general intent versus specific intent in­
structions on a set of mock juries deciding a case in which the de­
fendant was accused of stealing from vacant property old bricks 
that he claimed to believe were abandoned.163 As they should, ju­
ries more frequently convicted the defendant under the general­
intent instruction, which required only intent to do the act - ad­
mitted by the defendant - rather than intent to violate the law.164 
That finding, and further study on the binding effect of legal in­
structions, 165 led Sanders and Colasanto to conclude that "juries do 
160. See Jessica P. Greenwald et al., Psychological Self-Defense Jury Instructions: Influ­
ence on Verdicts for Battered Women Defendants, 8 BEHA v. SCI. & L. 171 (1990), discussed in 
FINKEL, supra note 9, at 244-45. 
161. See Greenwald et al., supra note 160, at 173-75. Greenwald sought to explore 
whether a revised instruction could improve the success of self-defense claims raised by bat­
tered women defendants. BWS claims are often not successful with juries, which has raised 
charges that either jurors are biased or that traditional self-defense rules are constructed on a 
male norm of immediate physical threat that ignores the psychological injury to women in 
abusive relationships. See id. at 172-73. 
162. Sanders and Colasanto's paper analyzes verdict decisions, while the next Part of this 
article studies transcripts of the deliberations that yielded those decisions. 
163. See Joseph Sanders & Diane Colasanto, The Use of Judicial Instructions in Jury 
Decision Making 7-10 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The fact pattern 
in this experiment was based on Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The general­
intent instruction required the jury to find only that the defendant intended the act of taking 
the bricks, "and it is not necessary to establish that the defendant knew that his act was a 
violation of the law." The specific-intent instruction required the jury to find that the defend­
ant "knowingly did an act that the law forbids, purposely intending to violate the law." See 
Sanders & Colasanto, supra, at 9-10. 
164. See Sanders & Colasante, supra note 163, at 12-13. 
165. Sanders and Colasanto also varied an instruction on the binding effects of the law. 
One instruction told jurors that it was their duty to apply the law as the judge stated it; an 
alternate version told jurors that instructions were merely intended as a helpful guide in 
reaching a "just and proper verdict." Id. at 9. Consistent with the premise that the defendant 
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use judicial instructions in deciding cases" and do feel constrained 
by the most restrictive instructions to convict despite personal senti­
ments.166 "[J]ury decision-making appears to be more principled 
than when the effect of instructfons is left unexamined" and gener­
ally "can be rational and principled."167 
Horowitz also examined the effects of instructions imposing a 
duty to the apply the law. In a large study of mock juries, he found 
that a strong nullification instruction - more explicit than is used 
in any jurisdiction - affected verdicts in drunken-driving and eu­
thanasia cases, though in different ways. The driver-defendant was 
relatively unsympathetic, and juries convicted him more often 
under the nullification instruction.168 The euthanasia defendant, on 
the other hand, was depicted very sympathetically, yet probably 
was guilty under the statute; juries acquitted him more frequently 
under the strong nullification instruction.169 In contrast, the in­
struction had no significant effect in a typical robbery-murder 
case.17° Interestingly, a weaker nullification instruction prompted 
no significant differences in verdicts or deliberations compared to 
juries that received no such instruction.171 
Further, Horowitz observed that instructions affected the con­
tents of deliberations. When informed of nullification power, jurors 
spent less time discussing evidence and more on defendant charac­
teristics, especially in the euthanasia case.172 They also gave more 
consideration to the case outcome and the defendant's intent in 
their evaluations of evidence.173 Instructions changed not only ver­
dicts but also the reasoning by which they were reached. Note the 
was a sympathetic man whom many would want to acquit, jurors receiving the no·duty in­
struction acquitted more often; those on whom the instructions imposed a duty to apply the 
general-intent rule usually convicted. See id. at 13, 17. 
166. See id. at 13, 17. 
167. Id. at 13, 17-18. 
168. See Horowitz, Effect, supra note 94, at 31-32, 34. 
169. See id. at 31-32. 
170. See id. at 33. 
171. See id. at 30-32. The weaker nullification instruction was one still used in Maryland, 
one of two states that give nullification instructions. See id. at 30. 
172. See id. at 34-35. A subsequent study found the same effect whether the nullification 
information came from a judge's (strong version) instruction or merely a defense attorney's 
argument: jurors treated sympathetic defendants more leniently and dangerous defendants 
more harshly. See Horowitz, Impact, supra note 94, at 446. Thus, a defense nullification 
argument backfired and increased the likelihood of a guilty verdict in an unsympathetic 
drunken-driver case. In scenarios in which the prosecutor challenged the defense nullifica­
tion argument, the nullification effect was significantly diminished. See id. at 446; id. at 452 
(concluding that "a challenge, and not a very direct one at that, to nullification sentiments is 
quite sufficient to curb the juries' potential desire to be liberated from the evidence"). 
173. See Horowitz, Impact, supra note 94, at 450-51. 
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characteristics of deliberations without nullification information: 
Horowitz found them focused on evidence and legal issues, with 
little attention to legally irrelevant matters. Yet even the broader 
considerations that the strong nullification instruction prompted 
may fit within a practical-reasoning description of criminal judg­
ment as an evaluation of character. Some attention to certain de­
fendant characteristics - like mental capacity or motive, but not 
race - and to the justice of the outcome may contribute legiti­
mately to an assessment of moral blameworthiness that criminal 
law theorists identify as a necessary component of a just guilty 
judgment.174 
Finally, the seminal study examining the effect of instructions on 
juries - the Chicago Jury Project's experiments on the insanity de­
fense - found that instructions had a significant effect.175 Tested 
with sixty-eight mock juries, the study found that juries given an 
insanity defense instruction based on the M'Naghten176 case re­
turned guilty verdicts significantly more often than juries given a 
Durham177 instruction or an instruction with no legal standard, 
which presumably allowed community sentiment to provide the 
rule.178 Jurors given the Durham instruction also deliberated 
longer.179 
The M'Naghten instruction makes the defendant's ability to dis­
tinguish right from wrong the basis of its insanity standard. Inter­
estingly, however, jurors given the other two instructions often 
addressed that ability as well, though less frequently than 
174. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 29, at 313-14, 373 (noting that we may rightly 
judge less harshly the mother who impulsively kills the rapist of her daughter than the man 
who impulsively kills a gay person out of homophobic hatred, because the former held a 
socially appropriate valuation of her daughter's well-being while the latter held a socially 
condemnable prejudice). 
175. See SIMON, supra note 91, at 70-77, 184-85, 199. 
176. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fmnelly 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), discussed 
in SIMON, supra note 91, at 8 (noting that "[u]nder the M'Naghten rule the defendant is 
excused only if he did not know what he was doing or did not know that what he was doing 
was wrong"). For the instruction given to mock jurors, see SIMON, supra note 91, at 45. 
177. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), discussed in SIMON, supra 
note 91, at 8 (noting the Durham rule "states that a defendant is excused if his act was the 
product of a mental disease or defecf'). For the instruction given to mock jurors, see SIMON, 
supra note 91, at 45-46. See also id. at 72-73 (noting that the Durham instruction "produces a 
powerful difference in jurors' verdicts" compared to the M'Naghten instruction). 
178. The "standardless" instruction stated only: "[I]f you believe the defendant was in­
sane at the time he committed the act of which he is accused, then you must find the defend­
ant not guilty by reason of insanity." SIMON, supra note 91, at 46; see also id. at 72-73 
(summarizing jury verdict data for different instructions). But see FINKEL, supra note 9, at 
280-82 (reporting other Studies of insanity instructions that yielded no significant differences 
in verdicts). 
179. See SIMON, supra note 91, at 75. 
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M'Naghten juries a sentiment M'Naghten may have helped 
shape.180 That seems to suggest that the M'Naghten standard incor­
porates an issue that popular sentiment considers crucial to deter­
minations of responsibility in insanity cases. It also suggests that lay 
approaches to criminal judgment, at least in this context, use con­
siderations that explore the defendant's moral capacity.181 
E. Conclusion 
The foregoing review of empirical literature reveals considera­
ble evidence that juries reason, incorporate contextual and norma­
tive considerations, and reach outcomes in ways comparable to 
judicial decisionmaking. What the literature does not fully answer 
is how jurors reach their verdicts in light of the interacting effects of 
fact interpretation, strong norms and justice notions, approaches of 
legal reasoning, and application of instructions. More specifically, 
we still do not have a description of rule interpretation by juries in 
terms of contemporary legal-reasoning strategies - a description of 
the content of jury reasoning about statutes. Values and norms 
sometimes affect verdicts, but we understand that some effects of 
values in judicial interpretation are both inevitable and, in some 
forms, normatively attractive. If we can determine the considera­
tions that lead jurors away from literal interpretations, we may find 
that they resemble judicial interpretive strategies that are widely 
regarded as acceptable, and even desirable. Qualitative study of 
jury deliberations can help us build a new, positive description of 
jury application of rules, one grounded in actual jury practice, as a 
process of practical reason.182 That description, in tum, will pro­
vide a basis for normative reassessment of how well juries interpret 
statutes. 
N. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN JURY DELIBERATIONS 
With the background of statutory-interpretation theory and the 
insights of empirical jury research, I now look at jury deliberations 
180. See id. 
181. For a more extensive discussion, see id. at 132-80. 
182. Even deliberations are not a full window into juror reasoning, just as judicial opin­
ions do not reveal the full range of considerations and influences on judges' decisionmaking. 
Cf. W.S. MERWIN, AsIAN FIGURES 65 (1973) (recounting a Chinese proverb: "A judge de­
cides for ten reasons, nine of which nobody knows"). It is clear that most jurors come to the 
deliberation with fairly strong inclinations toward a verdict option, which means they have 
reasoned alone, silently, about the application of rules to the facts. Not all of such private 
reasoning is likely to be revealed in group deliberation, nor are key factors that change ju­
rors' minds during deliberation necessarily clear from the spoken discussion. 
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in two cases in order to construct a preliminary theory of jury inter­
pretation of statutes. The cases complement each other in the in­
sights they collectively provide into jury reasoning. Both involve 
application of relatively simple statutes to cases in which the facts 
of the defendant's conduct and circumstances are not in real dis­
pute. Both focus on different but related issues of mens rea - the 
defendant's knowledge or intention. In both cases juries explicitly 
focus on the language of relevant instructions to decide those is­
sues. Yet the factual contexts vary in significant ways that are use­
ful for comparative study. Wisconsin v. Reed involves a very 
sympathetic, mentally challenged defendant, while Michigan v. 
Harris centers on a defendant of normal intelligence for whom 
some jurors express modest sympathy but others do not. Reed is a 
gun-possession case, a regulatory charge that implicates back­
ground concerns of public safety.1s3 Harris is a theft case, a malum 
in se offense that invokes strong norms of property rights. These 
factual permutations lead juries to draw on a range of different con­
siderations in their struggles to resolve application of scienter re­
quirements and, through that process, pass judgment on the 
defendant's culpability. 
A. Statutory Interpretation by the Jury in Wisconsin v. Reed 
With permission of a Wisconsin state court, the PBS documen­
tary program Frontline arranged to videotape the deliberations of 
jurors in an actual criminal case. In that case, Leroy Reed was 
charged with possession of a gun by a convicted felon. The facts 
were undisputed.184 Reed had been convicted of a felony several 
years earlier. He was not steadily employed and, according to ex­
pert testimony - which his in-court behavior seemed to confirm -
he was of "substantially sub-average" intelligence and could read 
only at a second-grade level. He legally purchased a handgun as 
part of a plan to take a mail-order course ·to become a private 
detective. While "hanging around the courthouse," a police officer 
asked Reed for identification and he produced the bill of sale for 
the gun he had purchased. He explained that he was taking a corre­
spondence course to become a private detective and, as part of the 
course, needed the gun for protection. The officer discovered that 
183. Though one might predict that a case in which a defendant is charged solely with 
having purchased and possessed a handgun - which was illegal for him because of his status 
as a convicted felon - might raise norms invoking a right to bear arms arising from the 
Constitution's Second Amendment, in fact no juror in Reed alluded to such norms or rights. 
184. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1. 
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Reed had a criminal record and asked Reed to go home, get the · 
gun, and bring it to the police department; Reed did so. He gave 
officers a statement that he owned the gun, and he was arrested. 
In closing arguments, the prosecutor emphasized that jurors had 
agreed to apply the law without sympathy or speculation.185 The 
defense attorney in effect argued for jury nullification, suggesting 
that "the law is being misapplied to these facts," and that "you have 
the power, despite all the technical legality, to find Leroy Reed not 
guilty. You're not violating the law by doing this."186 The judge, 
however, refused to give a jury instruction on nullification; he told 
the jurors that they must follow legal instructions.187 The statute 
required proof of three elements for conviction: that Reed was a 
convicted felon; that he possessed a gun; and that he knew he pos­
sessed the gun. 
The elements of the statute seemed clear to the jury; several 
jurors identified the three elements and noted that they had to find 
them proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict.188 The 
jury deliberated more than two hours before reaching a unanimous 
verdict of acquittal, and its discussion touched on several interpre­
tive strategies courts use to construe statutes. Several jurors, during 
their first round of comments, adopted a plain-meaning view of the 
statute and stated that they believed the three elements had been 
proven "technically."189 For a minority of jurors, this consideration 
was sufficiently strong that it led them to a preliminary vote of 
guilty, and no juror initially thought the statute ambiguous. One of 
the traditional considerations of statutory interpretation - ordi­
nary meaning of the text - was thus a strong factor early in the 
deliberation. 
Some jurors spoke hesitantly or apologetically of feeling "sym­
pathy" and of allowing that to affect their judgment.190 A vocal 
minority - apparently "rule-oriented" thinkers - explicitly chas­
tised or discouraged such sympathetic, contextual considerations. 
185. See id. 
186. Id. 
187. See id. Recalling Horowitz's study, we would expect the defense argument to have 
some effect on deliberations and the verdict, but that effect should be mitigated by the prose­
cutor's counterargument. See Horowitz, Impact, supra note 94, at 443-46. In his second 
study, Horowitz tested mock jurors with a simulated trial based closely on Reed; he found a 
strong effect of nullification arguments and instructions for this fact scenario. See id. 
188. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1. 
189. Jurors' comments included: "Technically, the man is guilty . . . .  "; "I agree that Mr. 
Reed is guilty based on the law."; and "I think those three elements have been met that yes 
he is guilty of the crime." Id. 
190. See id. 
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They urged that the statute's plairi meaning was the only proper 
consideration and it mandated a guilty verdict.191 This strand of the 
debate exhibits a clear conception of the jury's proper institutional 
role - to apply law objectively without excessive influence by emo­
tional, subjective considerations - and also about the proper way 
that the law should be applied. The argument contains a clear un­
derlying sense - though it does not prevail - that law should be 
read and applied in a literal, mechanical manner; facts or senti­
ments not identified as relevant by such a common-sense reading of 
the statute should play little or no role in the final judgment.192 
Several jurors, however, expressed discomfort with this literal 
reading of the statute. The facts that troubled some jurors - the 
defendant's sympathetic character, due to his substandard intelli­
gence and clearly nonthreatening demeanor, and also the question­
able police judgment in arresting such a person even after his full 
cooperation193 - were not legally relevant ones in a narrow sense. 
These sentiments conflict with the initial pull of the text's plain 
meaning. The jury's attention to them corresponds to a practical­
reasoning approach of judges who may reconsider a statute's plain 
meaning if other factors point toward alternate constructions.194 
Prompted by these concerns, the Reed jury addressed a wide 
range of considerations familiar from judicial statutory interpreta­
tion. One recurring theme was. a counteivision to the literal ap­
proach of the jury's role in applying the law. One juror, a doctor, 
stated, "[I]t's a tough position to be in, to say I am a judge of the 
191. See id. This is behavior we see throughout the Harris juries' deliberations as well. 
See infra section IV.B. 
192. Juror comments recounted in HANs & VroMAR, supra note 9, at 156-57 (quoting a 
juror explaining why she voted guilty despite her sympathy for the defendants' actions: "I'm 
in agreement with what they're trying to accomplish . . .  but they did break the law . . . .  [M]y 
personal views don't count. . . .  If we allow people to break the law, we're akin to anarchy . . . .  
I knew they were guilty when we were charged by the judge. I did not know prior to that 
time - I was in full agreement with the defendants until we were charged by the judge. That 
was the kiss of death!"), corroborate this constraint. See also Sanders & Colasanto, supra 
note 163, at 17 (reporting the results of experiments with a large set of mock juries that 
found, inter alia, that jurors felt constrained by an intent instruction to convict a defendant 
when, without such an instruction, they more frequently acquitted}. 
193. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1. 
194. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 55-57; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 352. We 
can also recognize the relational reasoning Conley and O'Barr identified in lay litigants; de­
spite the text's plain meaning, several jurors intuited notions of social justice, social roles, and 
responsibility that conflicted with that meaning. See supra notes 123-38 and accompanying 
text. We might recognize here also the Rawlsian process of checking the formal application 
of general rules against a more context-sensitive situation sense about the proper outcome of 
a given case - against our "considered judgment." See RAWLS, supra note 38, at 20-21, 48-
52, 579. 
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law, but I think that's what the jury system is for."195 He repeatedly 
insisted "I am not a computer" and argued that the jury's job was 
more than to assess mechanically whether evidence met literal 
readings of the statute: 
But I think we have more capabilities than to say, one, two, three, 
these [elements] are met on a very simple level. Cut and dried, guilty. 
I don't think that we as jurors, that is necessarily our role. We are 
here to do more than that. I'm trying to decide in my own mind, has 
justice been done here? I don't care what the law says. Has justice 
been done . . . . That's what we're here to do.196 
This view holds that justice considerations have a proper place 
in reaching a verdict and exhibits an intuitive construction of the 
jury's role in the legal system.197 This sense of institutional purpose 
gave jurors a conceptual opening to consider approaches other than 
a literal reading of the statute.198 Another juror offered the com­
puter metaphor as well and struggled with the same issue of 
whether a jury could do anything other than literal rule application: 
Are we obligated . . . to follow the letter of the law and find him 
guilty, or are we obligated as a jury to use our special level of con­
science . . . . According to the law as it's written, he meets the criteria. 
Do we rise above that somehow? Is there a place for us to then say 
. .. we cannot in good conscience find him guilty?199 
At least two jurors, throughout most of the deliberation, 
thought not. A vocal minority of jurors insisted that only a literal 
application of the statute was within the jury's authority.200 Even 
195. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1. 
196. Id. The context of this case may have led some jurors to assume that jurors have a 
broader role in applying the law. The case contained no factual disputes, and factfinding is a 
key jury function. With that task effectively eliminated, jurors may have searched for an­
other purpose for their role. This sense of the jury's role in law interpretation is much 
weaker in the Harris juries. See infra section IV.B. 
197. Chicago Jury Project researchers found similar evidence in mock jury deliberations 
that jurors sometimes consider the jury's institutional role within the justice system. See 
SIMON, supra note 91, at 163-70. They noted "the jury's recognition of its representative role 
and its sense of responsibility to society," id. at 170-71, and much discussion of the distinction 
between "the expert's function and the jury's responsibility," id. at 163. They concluded that 
"[t]he jury is too impressed with its importance as an institution and with its responsibility to 
the court and to the community at large to relinquish its decision-making powers." Id. at 170. 
198. This sense of their role recalls Huigens's point that "we do instruct juries. We do not 
mechanically hold persons to account against a rigid code." Huigens, supra note 30, at 1466. 
Huigens continues his point with an argument that describes both the Reed jury's predica­
ment and key points of its deliberations: "We employ juries because we place the person 
prior to the rule, because we are sensitive to the possibility that none of the rules may be 
adequate to describe justice in the given situation, and because the rules may conflict in a 
way that only human hands can unravel." Id. 
199. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1. 
200. See id. Interestingly, in Reed as well as in Harris, it was the better-educated jurors 
- a doctor, college professor, school psychologist, and teacher - who were most willing to 
explore interpretations beyond plain meaning. Those with presumably less formal education 
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jurors who, early in deliberations, expressed an inclination to medi­
ate literal application with other considerations made clear that 
they agreed generally with this criminal statute and were hesitant to 
disregard it. One such juror insisted that he wanted "to be a good 
juror" and added, in a sentiment explicitly stated by at least one 
other juror as well, "I think this is a good law. And I don't want to 
say or do anything that suggests that I don't take that law seri­
ously. "201 Nevertheless, jurors such as these (the majority) demon­
strated - to recall Conley and O'Barr's formulation - a less rule­
oriented reasoning than those who argued throughout for literal 
application. 
Most jurors were troubled sufficiently by contextual factors to 
make them notable parts of the discussion. One juror's ·justice 
calculus - whether the legal process has punished the defendant 
sufficiently without conviction - corresponds well with the findings 
of Kalven and Zeisel's jury study.202 "Leroy Reed has really had 
enough punishment, if you will, for what he did that was so wrong 
. . . .  Between his arrest and between his days in court now, an 
awful lot must have happened to him."203 While appropriately fo­
cused on normative justice for the defendant, this view neglects the 
importance of the verdict as a judgment on his culpability. Yet if 
jurors are at fault for making such an evaluation, it is a fault they 
share with judges. Studies of urban traffic courts find judges fre­
quently dismiss cases on the rationale that having to come to court 
is punishment enough for a minor ticket.204 
Several jurors' concerns had a relational and instrumental tone. 
One juror was troubled by what she considered improper police be­
havior. "I don't think if they are living to the letter of the law that 
[the police officer] had any right to ask this man to go home and 
bring in that weapon."205 While her assumption about the law is 
- a fireman and tool maker - argued hardest for plain meaning. This anecdotal observa­
tion, of course, tells us little about general correlations between education levels (or other 
demographic variations) and approaches to statutory interpretation. But it suggests an ave­
nue for further study that would build on existing research that examines how demographic 
differences correlate with participation in the jury room. Some studies suggest, for example, 
that more educated jurors speak more often in deliberations, raise more legal issues, and rate 
judges' instructions as less clear than do jurors with less education. See, e.g., liAsnE ET AL., 
supra note 67, at 135-38 (reporting such findings and noting other studies). 
201. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1. 
202. See KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 301-05. 
203. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1.  
204. See E. Au.AN LIND & ToM R. TYLER, THE SoCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 2 (1988). - . 
205. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1. 
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incorrect, her concern reveals a relational-reasoning inclination to 
place judgment of the defendant's conduct in a broader context of 
morally or socially improper official behavior. Jurors also explicitly 
discussed signaling the prosecutor's office about the use of its dis­
cretion in pursuing this charge, again setting the defendant's con­
duct in a broader context that gives attention to the moral judgment 
of other actors.206 One juror said he "wine[ ed]" as "a cognitive 7 
year old [the defendant207] get[s] caught up in this legal mechanism 
. . .  with this exquisitely agonizing thoroughness" and "puts him 
through the entire mill. . . . It was like watching a grown man beat a 
child."208 Voicing a comparable instrumental concern, another ju­
ror assessed the social need for a conviction. "I look at the defend­
ant and I think, '[I]s he a threat to society?' . . . And if he's 
dangerous to society, why would the [police] detective . . .  allow him 
to bring the gun in, transport it on a public bus . . .  if he felt that he 
was a dangerous felon?"209 
Such instrumental concerns are familiar components of legal 
reasoning.210 Yet if the jury based its verdict on such factors, its 
rationale and reasoning would rightly be condemned for neglecting 
its objective of voicing moral judgment on individual conduct, and 
perhaps for ignoring statutory text. Interestingly, however, the 
Reed jury did not abandon statute application to base its verdict 
explicitly on such concerns. In accord with its resistance to nonlit­
eral statute construction, the jury eventually turned to a close anal­
ysis of statutory language, reading key terms consistently with the 
considerations pointing away from a guilty verdict. A minority of 
206. See id. 
207. The defense's expert witness at trial stated that the defendant had the cognitive ca­
pacity of a seven-year-old. See id. 
208. Id. In response to the perceived inappropriateness of the prosecution, this juror 
elsewhere says, "I'd like to send [a message] to the DA's office . . . .  [T]he message would be, 
dammit to hell, I'm afraid to walk to my car in the parking lot. . . .  [My students are] being 
mugged. And you give me, you give me Leroy. And I feel like saying, guys, you're doing a 
hell of a job." Id. 
209. Id. Another juror immediately responded "I don't think that's a question," and then 
another went on to discuss "these bigger questions about where's justice, who's being served, 
and why was this case brought?" Id. 
210. One obvious example is the law-and-economics movement's argument that the in­
centive effects of rules should serve efficiency or other behavioral goals, but instrumental 
concerns have a broader history in modem legal reasoning as well. See RoBERT SUMMERS, 
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). 
The Supreme Court has also identified instrumental concerns as part of the justification 
for the Sixth Amendment's criminal jury trial right. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 
162, 174-75 (1986) (asserting that juries guard against the " 'exercise of arbitrary power' " 
coming from an " 'overzealous or mistaken prosecutor' " (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522, 530 (1975)); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972) (same); Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (same). 
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the jurors was inclined to apply the statute literally and reach a 
guilty verdict; the remainder wanted a way to vote not guilty and 
yet do so within a good-faith application of the statute. 
Discussion of statutory language focused on the word "know" in 
the element of the statute requiring that the defendant knew he had 
a gun. Jurors' reluctance to ignore the law and desire for a just 
outcome led them to explore whether this defendant, who had lim­
ited cognitive capabilities, knew he possessed the gun. The context 
and purpose of the term's application to this cognitively subaverage 
defendant were important. Jurors struggled to construct and agree 
upon a functional definition of "know." One juror - an English 
professor - admitted, "I'm having trouble with the word 'gun,' but 
I'm really having trouble with that word 'to know.' "211 Another 
juror, a school psychologist, suggested this inquiry: 
I wonder if we could find room in the law, for those of us that feel we 
need to follow the letter of the law, that perhaps he didn't, in the full 
sense of the word, know he was a felon, and didn't, in the full sense of 
the word, know that he possessed a firearm . . . .  Even among psychol­
ogists this is going to be a very debatable issue. You know, I think 
we're talking about at what level did he know it, we need what that 
is.212 
The jurors who held out the longest for a guilty verdict resisted this 
level of inquiry into the statute's meaning.213 But most jurors found 
it relevant and persuasive, seemingly because it helped to bridge 
their broader justice concerns about convicting the defendant with 
their desire to apply the statute with integrity rather than disregard 
it. 
In construing the word "know," the Reed jurors faced a recur­
ring problem of interpretive construction in criminal law of the type 
that Kelm.an argued is typically resolved "nonrationally."214 Yet 
the jury's construction of this mens rea term resembles a well­
established judicial policy for construing criminal statutes - the 
rule of lenity. That rule, grounded largely on notions of fair warn­
ing, calls for penal statutes to be construed narrowly, so that ambi­
guities work in favor of the defendant.215 Courts recognize that the 
211. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1. 
212. Id. 
213. See id. 
214. See Kelman, supra note 88; see also supra text accompanying notes 84-91. 
215. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 949-50 (1988); Rewis v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scarr, JR., CruM!NAL 
LAW 77-78 {2d ed. 1986) {discussing the rule of lenity); id. at 76 (noting that "courts some­
times conclude that what seems to be clear language is so harsh or foolish or devoid of sense 
that it is ambiguous after all"); id. at 78-79 (noting that courts continue to apply the rule of 
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rule varies, however, with the nature of the crime. For plainly 
wrong or horrible (malum in se) crimes, the rule applies less strin­
gently than for malum prohibitum crimes that violate no clear social 
norms.216 Reed's crime was hardly a clear moral wrong.211 He vio­
lated a typical regulatory statute that should be construed narrowly 
under the lenity rule.21s Moreover, in finding an ambiguity219 in the 
state-of-mind requirement and then opting for a more stringent 
construction, the Reed jury mimicked a longstanding judicial cus­
tom of increasing the level of the required mens rea element, or 
implying one even when the statute does not provide it, in order to 
effectuate the lenity rule and ensure that a culpable mental state 
accompanies any conviction.22° 
Mens rea elements often serve a decision-rule function of guid­
ing the individualized judgment of culpability.221 Such a judgment 
in Reed had to take account of the defendant's limited intelligence 
- a fact central to assessing his culpability, his capacity for practi­
cal judgment, and thereby his character. But it had to do so without 
clear guidance from criminal rules, because Reed could not make a 
plausible insanity plea and was found competent to stand trial. 
Dan-Cohen summarizes the common law tradition of construct­
ing scienter elements by concluding that "the defendant's state of 
mind satisfies the mens rea requirement in a criminal statute if the 
defendant perceives the facts and the nature of his conduct in terms 
of the statute's ordinary-language description of them."222 The 
lenity even after legislatures have ostensibly repealed it, because the rule "seems to be an 
attitude of mind that is not readily changed by legislation"). 
216. See O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 50 {1881); J.W. HuRST, DEALING WITH 
STATUTES 64-65 (1982) (arguing that courts follow community standards as a context in 
which to coµstrue the ambit of a statute); LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 215, at 79 (noting 
that the rule applies more strictly to crimes "involving morally bad conduct . • •  than those 
involving conduct not so bad"). 
217. On the contrary, gun ownership accords with a strong constitutional norm grounded 
in the Second Amendment right to bear arms, though jurors did not mention this. 
218. The Model Penal Code replaces the lenity rule with one requiring that statutory 
terms be given their "fair import." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3) (1985). One arguably 
can interpret the statutory term "know" as the jury did in the Reed case under the approach 
of the Model Penal Code as well. 
219. Nor is the jury doing anything different from courts in finding a simple word like 
"know" ambiguous. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 215, at 76-79. 
220. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (stat­
ing that the Court, "in keeping with the common-law tradition and with the general injunc· 
tion that 'ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of 
lenity,' has on a number of occasions read a state-of-mind component into an offense even 
when the statutory definition did not in terms so provide" (quoting Lewis v. United States, 
401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)). 
221. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text. 
222. Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 662. 
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mens rea requirement calls not only for knowledge of facts but also 
"of the legal categories under which they fall," both of which de­
pend on "linguistic categories."223 
One is aware of a given fact only when one can provide some cer­
tain description of it. When we inquire into a defendant's state of 
mind and ask whether she was aware of the nature of her conduct, we 
must already possess a tentative (or hypothetical) description of a 
mode of conduct provided by the relevant criminal statute. It is only 
against such a description that we can ascertain and judge the defend­
ant's state of mind: did her perception of the facts match the descrip­
tion in the statute? One can, for example, fully appreciate the fact 
that one's finger is pulling a small metal lever connected ·to a larger 
metal instrument and yet fail to know that one is "pulling the trigger 
of a gun" or that one is "shooting," let alone that one is about to 
"kill" someone. To say simply that mens rea requires knowledge only 
of facts obscures the crucial choice of the description against which 
the adequacy of that knowledge will be measured.224 
From this analysis - which develops Kelman's argument about 
choices in interpretive construction225 - we can further understand 
both the Reed jury's difficulty with constructing an appropriate def­
inition of knowledge and the difficulty of factually describing 
Reed's mens rea.226 The jurors' effort to define the content of the 
word "know" was an attempt to arrive at a "description of a mode 
of conduct" against which to compare Reed's state of mind. Dan­
Cohen's example of the choices one must make to construct a base­
line description of firing a gun to commit a homicide is precisely 
analogous to the Reed jury's choice among alternative levels of 
knowledge against which to judge Reed. One juror described just 
such a change in his baseline choice this way: 
. . .  I came into this room saying the same thing, yes, the three points 
are met, on face value, he's guilty. Now those first two points, you 
could define them, you know, it says that he had to know that he 
possessed a gun. He might have "known" that he possessed a piece of 
his [private detective] course . . . .  Maybe he just was simply following 
instructions. He had no relationship like you or I or anybody else does 
in this room between a gun and bang-bang . . . . [He thinks] he's now 
going to be a detective. "I'm going to be a stand-up citizen and be a 
detective," and the course says-something about a gun. He's going to 
do everything he can to do it right. Did he really know what he was 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 662-63. 
225. See Kelman, supra note 88; supra text accompanying notes 84-91. 
226. Cf. supra section III.A (discussing empirical research regarding story-based interpre­
tation of facts). 
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doing or the consequences, did he know a gun was purchased, or did he 
purchase an item of his course. 221 
Rather than inappropriately reading ambiguity into a clear and 
simple term, the Reed jurors recognized and explicitly debated an 
inevitable choice that must be made in statutory application - a 
choice no doubt frequently overlooked by judges and juries alike.228 
We can see why Reed's mental capacity prompted this inquiry and 
made his case difficult. Dan-Cohen notes that a defendant needs 
"merely ordinary linguistic aptitude" to understand criminal rules 
and that a mens rea requirement is "satisfied when the defendant 
has acted with the awareness normally possessed by an intelligent 
member of a moral and linguistic community."229 The jury quite 
plausibly concluded that Reed lacked such ordinary capacity,230 and 
as a consequence his blameworthiness was insufficient to warrant a 
conviction. Thus in Reed, as in criminal judgments generally, the 
decisions made in construction of statutes involve unavoidable nor­
mative choices. Through such choices criminal judgment is always, 
at some level, a personal, moral, and context-sensitive assess­
ment. 231 
This interpretive struggle suggests - contrary to some commen­
tators, including the Frontline narrator232 - that the verdict was 
not an act of nullification. That is, the jury did not deliberately dis­
regard a statute that by all plausible constructions mandated con­
viction. Rather, they construed the statute, motivated by justice, 
policy, and moral concerns, in a manner that allowed, or even re­
quired, a not-guilty verdict. We can see, in the jury's extended ef­
fort to arrive at a working definition of the statutory term, the same 
sort of decisionmaking that has prompted scholars of judicial deci­
sionmaking to describe statutory interpretation as inevitably a pro­
cess of creative policymaking. It also provides an effective example 
of practical reasoning in criminal-statute construction. In turn, we 
see how practical reason serves the task of criminal adjudication to 
227. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1 (emphasis added). 
228. That judges overlook such choices in interpretive construction is a central point 
made by Mark Kelman. See Kelman, supra note 88. 
229. Dan-Cohen, supra note 20, at 663. 
230. This is true even though his capacity did not implicate competency or insanity rules. 
231. See Huigens, supra note 30; supra text accompanying notes 27-38. 
232. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1; see also Horowitz, Impact, supra 
note 94, at 443 (describing the Reed verdict as resulting from "the jury's explicit decision to 
nullify the law"); Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of 
Jury Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 165, 168 (1991) (describing the Reed verdict as 
nullification). 
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assess ex post whether one who violates a rule of conduct is 
blameworthy. 
B. Statutory Interpretation in the Mock Jury Deliberations of 
Michigan v. Harris 
While Reed presents the problem of defining the content of a 
single statutory term in light of several contextual factors, Michigan 
v. Harris233 raises the difficulty of defining the reach of a state-of­
mind requirement across several statutory elements. The Harris ju­
ries easily defined the content of the intent requirement and fo­
cused on whether it applied to circumstance as well as conduct 
elements. Because they pursued this problem of statutory interpre­
tation with reference to a widely held social norm based in the com­
mon law, we also can view the Harris juries as using a public-values 
analysis common in judicial interpretation. 
In Harris, fictional defendant William Harris is a retired ma­
chinist who took a pile of bricks from a vacant property on which 
they had been sitting for the eight months since the property's sole 
building had burned down.234 All remains of the burned building 
except the bricks had been removed. The lot was fenced and had a 
"private property" sign but lacked a gate.235 The bricks were 
marred by burn scars and old mortar. Harris stated at trial that he 
came to assume, during the eight months between when the build­
ing burned and when he took the bricks, that the bricks were aban­
doned. So, one afternoon Harris loaded them into his truck, took 
them home, cleaned them, and built a barbecue with them. He was 
seen loading the bricks by a woman who lived across the street from 
the vacant property and who knew him socially. When the owner 
233. The case file was constructed, and this mock jury experiment conducted, by Profes­
sor Joseph Sanders and his colleagues at the University of Michigan. Sanders had 48 mock 
juries, usually six members each, deliberate for about 30 minutes each. Not all reached unan­
imous verdicts. The variables tested were public ownership versus private ownership of the 
property; general-intent instructions versus specific-intent instructions; and an instruction 
commanding jurors to follow the law given by the judge versus one stating that the law was 
intended only to be helpful in reaching a just and proper verdict. The experiment is further 
described in James A. Holstein, Jurors' Interpretations and Jury Decision Making, 9 LAW & 
HUM. BEHA v. 83, 86-89 (1985). My data for this article consists of eight transcribed jury 
deliberations - one from each "cell" of the research design, that is, one deliberation under 
each of the variable conditions - as well as the paper by Sanders and Diane Colasanto, 
supra note 163, which analyzed the verdicts of all 48 mock juries. 
234. For the background facts of the Harris mock case, see the Ha"is Case Stimulus (on 
file with author). 
235. Ownership of the property was actually one of the variables tested in this mock trial; 
half the juries were told an individual owned the lot and that it was posted "private prop­
erty," while the other half were told the state of Michigan owned it, and thus the sign read 
"property of the state of Michigan." See Sanders & Colasanto, supra note 163, at 8-9. 
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reported the bricks missing to the police, the police checked with 
the woman, and she identified Harris. Harris admitted to the po­
lice, and at trial, that he took the bricks because he thought they 
were abandoned. 
The only real legal issue in Harris, then, was the defendant's 
state of mind. Half the mock juries on the Harris case received a 
general-intent instruction, which stated in part that "the defend­
ant's intention is inferred from his voluntary commission of the act 
forbidden by law, and it is not necessary to establish that the de­
fendant knew that his act was a violation of the law."236 The other 
half received a specific-intent instruction, which stated in part that 
"the crime charged in this case requires proof of specific intent . . . .  
To establish specific intent the government must prove that the de­
fendant knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely in­
tending to violate the law."237 In addition, both juries were told: 
To sustain the charge of theft, the State must prove the following 
propositions: 
First: That Steven P. Connolly238 was the owner of the bricks in ques­
tion; and 
Second: That the defendant knowingly obtained unauthorized control 
over the bricks; and 
Third: That the defendant intended to deprive Steven P. Connolly 
permanently of the use or benefit of the bricks.239 
Thus structured, the Harris case poses a familiar issue of crimi­
nal law: the nature of a defendant's intent and the nature of intent 
required for conviction. Must the defendant intend only the physi­
cal act - picking up bricks - or also the consequences - depriv­
ing the owner of their use? Must he intend also the criminal nature 
of the act, that is, must he intend to commit a crime,. or at least 
intend to do something he knows is wrong? The differing instruc­
tions address this issue, but the language common to both raises it 
as well. The Harris juries struggled with whether the requirement 
that "the defendant knowingly obtained unauthorized control" 
meant: (a) that he took the bricks - which he happened not to 
have authority to do - to which his knowledge or mistaken belief 
was irrelevant, or (b) that he took the bricks knowing he was not 
authorized to do so. They debated, in other words, a basic problem 
236. Id. at 9-10. 
237. Id. at 10. 
238. For the half of the juries told that property was publicly owned, the instructions 
substituted "the state of Michigan" for Connelly's name. See supra note 235. 
239. 'I!anscript of Michigan v. Harris Trial Simulation 12-13 (instructions given to mock 
juries) (on file with author); see, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 11 (on file with 
author); 'I!anscript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 16. 
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of criminal code construction: does the mens rea requirement ex­
tend only to the conduct element, or also to the circumstance ele­
ment?240 This interpretive problem goes to the heart of defining 
culpability: Is one blameworthy under the former construction, or 
only under the latter? For answers, jurors turned to a core set of 
norms and a broader set of interpretive strategies. 
The Harris fact pattern includes several elements addressed by 
jurors that point toward acquittal. Some jurors find the defendant 
somewhat sympathetic; he has no criminal record, save for a reck­
less driving conviction.241 His alleged criminal act and its resulting 
harm were, in the view of some jurors, de minimus.242 Others 
viewed it as conduct better addressed by civil proceedings focused 
on restitution rather than criminal blame.243 In accord with Kalven 
and Zeisel's :findings about assessments of victim's behavior, several 
juries raised the issue of whether the property owner was remiss in 
not putting a gate on the property, posting a sign on the bricks, or 
otherwise preventing the appearance of abandonment.244 More­
over, for many jurors, the defendant's claim that he intended no 
crime and believed he was taking abandoned property made his in­
tent insufficient for conviction.24s 
None were sufficiently strong to overcome many jurors' plain­
language interpretations of the statute, particularly under the 
general-intent instruction. The plain-language approach here is 
strengthened by considerations that point toward conviction, lead­
ing many jurors to feel no need to explore interpretations of intent 
instructions that would support acquittal.246 The most important 
240. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 8-10. 
241. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6, at 6, 10 (deciding that Harris was "not a 
criminal," even to those convinced he committed this criminal act). Other jurors had no 
sympathy for the defendant. See, e.g., 'Ii"anscript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 26 ("I think the guy 
was trying to get away with something."). Like the Reed jurors, members of several of the 
Harris juries disapproved of allowing "sympathy" to affect their judgment and tried, con­
sciously at least, not to allow sympathy or emotion to affect their, or fellow jurors', judg­
ments. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 1, at 10; 'Ii"anscript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 22. 
242. See, e.g., 'Ii"anscript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 13. 
243. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 8 (several jurors agreeing that the "equi­
table" outcome would be restitution or "return the bricks and it's all over"). 
244. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 2, 10-11; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 4; 
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 7; see also KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 242-57. 
245. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6, at 5, 7; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 
14. 
246. Of the eight deliberations studied here, none of the juries unanimously acquitted the 
defendant. Jury No. 1 hung 3-3, Jury No. 2 hung 4-2 for acquittal, Juries Nos. 3 & 6 voted 
unanimously for guilty, and the remainder hung with 4-1, 4-2, or 6-1 majorities voting for 
conviction. See Harris transcript materials (on file with author) (verdict forms accompanying 
each transcript document file). The high percentages of hung juries presumably arose from 
the 30-minute time limit on deliberations. 
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such factor, discussed by every jury and dominating discussion of 
some, was a common norm we can identify as a law-based public­
value - the private-property norm. For many jurors, this theft case 
implicated the strong value they place on private ownership of 
property, including the right to exclude others and to do with prop­
erty what one wishes - such as leaving items untended indefinitely. 
Many jurors expected the law to be applied so as to reinforce this 
fundamental property norm and to impose no ongoing obligations 
on owners - such as posting signs to forestall assumptions of 
abandonment.247 
This property norm was so strong and pervasive that for many 
jurors it was the explicit baseline of their legal reasoning. Most ju­
ries had members who concluded that the defendant failed to per­
form an implicit obligation to check with the owner before taking 
the bricks,248 an expectation that arises from the property norm. 
The norm also cut against the defendant's asserted belief that the 
property was abandoned. Jurors who strongly held to the norm 
tended either to :find the defendant's claimed belief incredible or, if 
honestly held, then unreasonable and worthy of little weight.249 
The property norm in its strongest version - expressed by mem­
bers of several juries - undercuts the very idea of abandonment, 
that is, that ownership can be relinquished by any means other than 
express gift or sale and that property can be unowned.25° 
247. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 23; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 
11 ("It's private, it belongs to somebody else. You want to have to post . . .  the whole front of 
your front lawn no trespassing, private property, . . .  just to prevent somebody from walking 
off with something that's . . .  in your front yard?"). 
Jurors who held strongly to the private property norm occasionally voiced overt disagree· 
ment with the specific-intent requirement, which they saw as undercutting criminal convic­
tions for those who take others' property. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 20 ("I 
wish they hadn't put . . .  in [the element requiring proof that the defendant intended to 
deprive the owner of property]."); id. at 28 ("We're going to have to edit that tape [which 
recorded the judge's instructions on specific intent]."). On the other side, one juror who 
leaned strongly toward acquittal because she thought the defendant's intent was insufficiently 
blameworthy also voiced disagreement with the law. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 
5-6. More often, jurors did not overtly voice such disagreement but did allow strongly held 
property norms to convince them of an application of the intent requirement that supported 
conviction. 
248. See 'Ii:anscript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 6-8, 11; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 11; 
'Ii:anscript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 1-2, 4, 6, 11; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 4, 19, 20. 
249. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, passim (Juror 2); Transcript for Harris Jury 
No. 5, at 9; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6, at 2, 3, 10. 
250. See, e.g., 'Ii:anscript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 9, 21; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 
2 ("It's got to belong to somebody."); Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 11 ("I personally 
think • . •  property . . .  does belong to somebody." (first ellipsis in original)); id. at 20 ("But 
how can somebody abandon it when it's on private property?" "That's what I don't get 
either. I don't get that at all."); Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 12, 17 ("Even 'aban­
doned' doesn't mean that it's not . . .  doesn't belong to someone." "All property is owned by 
somebody." (ellipsis in original)). 
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The property norm provides an important baseline for the Har­
ris jurors' understanding of the defendant's intent. For those start­
ing with the assumption that all property is owned and can never be 
taken without first asking the owner, the defendant's decision to 
take the bricks necessarily implied that he also intended to deprive 
an owner of the bricks.251 The strongest version of this approach, 
imbuing the property norm with clear moral content, inferred also 
that anyone taking property - and thus knowingly depriving its 
owner of it -· knew also that he was committing a moral wrong� if 
not a crime.252 
With this baseline assumption about "common moral sense," 
such jurors concluded that the defendant's admission that he took 
the bricks met the statutory requirement that the "defendant know­
ingly obtained unauthorized control over the bricks." Jurors could 
reach this conclusion by either statutory or factual construction: 
either the mens rea element does not extend to the circumstance 
element of no-authorization because extending it allows more ac­
quittals and so weakens property rights, or the defendant, knowing 
that he did not ask the owner's permission, thereby knew that his 
taking was unauthorized.253 Thus, by deciding to take the bricks 
"the defendant intended to deprive [the owner] permanently of the 
use or benefit of the bricks. "254 
Recall again Kelman's critique of interpretive construction of 
criminal law doctrine, its relation to factual interpretation, and the 
normative premises on which such constructions must be made.255 
If the ultimate fit of a factual and legal interpretation hinges in 
251. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 13-14 ("I'm beginning to feel that quite 
possibly this guy did have the intent of . . .  depriving this guy of his bricks . . . .  [T]he intent is 
established because he never tried to find out if he could have them . . . .  [A]nd he knew that 
the bricks were not his."); Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 11-13. 
252. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, passim (Juror 2); see also '!ranscript for 
Harris Jury No. 5, at 1 ("Now I'm sure he knows right from wrong . . .  in the sense that . . .  he 
knew there was a sigu there saying private property, and private property is . . .  just exactly 
what it says, belongs to somebody else and what's on it, you know . . .  belongs to somebody 
else . . . .  "); id. at 2 ("I'm sure that in the back of his mind that he knew that [the bricks] had 
to belong to someone . . . [y ]ou just don't do that."); id. at 7; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, 
at 12-13 (Jurors 5 & 6); id. at 16 ("[H]e knows that that's wrong it says private property."; 
"Sigu that says private property . . .  to me it's not abandoned, it is private property."); Tran­
script for Harris Jury No. 8, at 7 ("[I]t's a terrible thing to think that the man's property was 
taken in the first place, you know." "That's true, yes."); id. at 20 ("[P]roperty does belong to 
somebody. Now I could conceive of myself maybe going in there and saying, I could proba­
bly get away with a truckload of these bricks . . . .  But, by the same token, going in there, I 
would have to say in my own mind, I know that building must belong to somebody."). 
253. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 4. 
254. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 28; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 
13 ("By taking [the bricks] he willfully deprived [the owner].") 
255. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
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large part on the baseline normative vision that it serves, then it 
should not surprise us that a decisionmaker would tend to be per­
suaded by a construction of an instruction that most readily serves 
her sense of the proper outcome. Here, conviction and the underly­
ing property norm are served by not extending the mens rea re­
quirement to the circumstance element of authorization. Should 
that construction seem unpersuasive, the decisionmaker may reas­
sess the factual interpretation to conclude that the defendant pos­
sessed intent with regard to the lack of authorization as well.256 
As part of the property-norm approach, some jurors referred to 
the fact that the defendant violated a separate law not at issue -
the law of trespass.257 The trespass concern is a natural extension 
of the property norm, but we can also view the perceived relevance 
of defendant's trespass as an effort by the jury at "horizontal coher­
ence" within the collection of statutes that protect property. Legis­
lation scholars note that courts sometimes tum to statutes related to 
the one they must apply - others in the same act or regulating 
similar matters - for help in construing the statute's meaning and 
ensuring the compatibility of this application with the purposes of 
other statutes.258 Comparably, jurors concerned with trespass vio­
lations - and motivated by a strong property norm - wanted the 
theft statute in Harris broadly interpreted. Failure to convict for 
this taking, they reasoned, implicitly permits trespass and weakens 
property owners' right to exclude others from their land. A coher­
ent regime of statutes that enforce property rights will strictly for­
bid both trespasses and takings. 
While a few jurors with strong property-rights views expressed 
no sympathetic understanding of Harris's conduct - any trespass 
and taking seemed to them plainly wrong - more jurors voiced 
some sympathy. Demonstrating the strength of the property norm, 
even jurors who found the defendant an amiable retiree who was 
256. Eskridge has offered a gravity metaphor to describe the varying influence public 
values may have on statutory interpretation in relation to other considerations. See Eskridge, 
supra note 13, at 1018-19. Thus, a public value to which an interpreter is strongly committed 
exerts a strong "gravitational pull" toward an interpretation that accords with it, particularly 
if the language is unclear. See id. Its pull will be weaker, however, if it conflicts with clear 
language. See id. 
257. See, e.g., 'IIanscript for Harris Jury No. 1, at 18; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 4. 
258. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 239 (tracing the horizontal-coherence concern back 
to the legal realists and noting that it strives for compatibility not only with current statutes 
but also with current norms). See generally id. at 239-74 (distinguishing and discussing hori­
zontal and vertical coherence). 
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"not a criminal" and who intended no crime still thought he com­
mitted a "mistake of judgment" that merited conviction.259 
Interpretations based on a strong property norm conflicted with 
the familiar premise that moral blame requires the defendant to 
know and intend the full nature of his act with knowledge of all 
relevant circumstances. This premise supports a mistake-of-fact de­
fense, and it led a minority of the Harris jurors to vote for acquittal. 
Most juries conscientiously analyzed instructions,260 often listening 
repeatedly to a recording of them. They tried to determine whether 
the mens rea requirement extended to all elements, particularly the 
elements of knowledge of ownership and knowledge of the criminal 
nature of the act. They assessed how the defendant's belief that the 
property was abandoned fit within their legal analysis and recon­
ciled this larger process with their conflicting sentiments about the 
wrongfulness of the taking and the basically benign nature of the 
defendant's intent.261 
The property norm thus provided a moral framework within 
which to judge Harris's culpability and, more specifically, the mis­
take-of-fact defense that his belief about abandonment raised. The 
pervasiveness of references to the defendant's duty-to-ask and to 
the unreasonableness of his assumption of abandonment provides a 
way to assess whether the defendant's mistake was unreasonable 
and thereby his conduct culpable. With the property norm as the 
baseline for their judgment, jurors found Harris's mistake 
blameworthy. 
259. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 6. Here again we see how jurors sometimes recog­
nize the nature of criminal adjudication as a judgment about moral choices. In accord with 
Robinson and Darley's findings about citizen sentiments on punishment, see ROBINSON & 
DARLEY, supra note 121, at 210-12, jurors thought of their decision in a larger context of just 
deserts for the defendant Many wanted the defendant punished very lightly - or made 
simply to pay restitution - but still felt a guilty verdict was necessary, either to label accu­
rately the nature of his conduct or because the rule of law demanded it. See, e.g., Transcript 
for Harris Jury No. 4, at 27; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 18 ("I think we have to find 
him guilty. Now the judge . . .  maybe [will] give him a suspension . . . .  he wouldn't put him in 
jail . . . .  "); 'D:anscript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 8-9 ("[I]t's really based on the law [and] to me 
the man is guilty. It is an unfortunate thing that he's guilty, and if, in a broader sense, there is 
justice, he won't go to jail." "I would have to agree. It's an unfortunate . . .  I feel kind of bad 
that the gentleman [is guilty] • . .  but the law was broken, as far as I'm concerned, and he was 
guilty • . . .  " {first ellipsis in original)); id. at 25. 
260. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 1, at 22; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 4; 
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 4, at 6; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 5, at 14-19; Transcript for 
Harris Jury No. 7, at 10, 15; Transcript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 11-14. 
261. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 12-13 (finding that the defendant's mis­
taken belief of abandonment negated the intent-to-deprive element). From the deliberation, 
it is unclear whether Jury No. 7's members do this primarily as a decision of statutory inter­
pretation or more from normative reluctance to convict the defendant without such intent, 
though the premise of practical reasoning and dynamic interpretation is that those two are 
usually inseparably related. 
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In this way, jurors confronted the enduring tension in criminal 
law between descriptive and normative uses of the same term. On 
the mistake-of-fact issue, they opted for the latter.262 In giving 
moral content to the mistake, the Harris juries used statutory appli­
cation to make the normative judgment at the heart of criminal ad­
judication; at best, their reasoning led to verdicts that were fairly 
explicit and plausible evaluations of Harris's character while still 
working within the statutory language. One can disagree with the 
construction by challenging the jury's choice of norms, but the crim­
inal law's equation of liability with moral blame makes statutory 
interpretation a necessary means to judge culpability.263 
Still, a minority of jurors were particularly concerned that the 
defendant's intent was insufficient for criminal liability. For exam­
ple, one juror repeatedly expressed the sentiment that "I feel he is 
innocent because he was not aware that what he was doing was a 
violation of the law."264 But a larger number of jurors clearly felt 
bound by a more inculpatory reading of the law, and they felt that 
they had a duty to apply it objectively regardless of their personal 
disagreement with it or sympathy for the defendant.265 This is not 
to say, of course, that jurors who in good faith tried to apply the law 
neutrally in fact succeeded and were unaffected by norms or values. 
Judges, after all, are criticized for the same sorts of failures.266 
The recurrent theme among jurors that the law is objective and 
constrains their discretion connects closely with recurring views 
about the proper role of juries. A few jurors repeated the dominant 
notion from the Reed jury that jurors are not "computers" and are 
expected to apply the law in light of widely held values and com-
262. The descriptive use, in contrast, would simply inquire whether the defendant in fact 
made the mistake that negated the intent or knowledge required to commit the crime defined 
in the statute. See FLETCHER, supra note 29, at 395-401, 516-41 (tracing the shift from crimi­
nal law judgments as largely descriptive to "the centrality of normative guilt in the criminal 
process"). 
263. See id. at 532-38. 
264. Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 13. This juror's sentiment is consistent with psy­
chologists' understanding of attribution theory. See FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INrnRPERSONAL RELATIONS (1958); Edward E. Jones & Keith E. Davis, From Acts to Dispo­
sition: The Attribution Process in Person Perception, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL So. 
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1965). The above sources are both discussed in 
FINKEL, supra note 9, at 159. 
265. See, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 15 (recording several jurors arguing that 
the law is and should be fixed and objective, that "there has to be something absolute you 
can count on," and that "there has to be something where it's either this or that"). 
266. For criticisms of judges who claim to apply statutes by such purportedly neutral cri­
teria as plain meaning, see, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 4; Eskridge, supra note 13; Frickey, 
supra note 4; Zeppos, supra note 4. 
March 1998] Jury Interpretation 1257 
mon sense.261 But in contrast to Reed, most of the Harris jurors felt 
the jury's only duty was to resolve factual disputes and apply the 
law neutrally, with as little interpretation as possible.268 In the most 
pointed example of this sentiment, one juror perceptively argued 
that juries should simply apply the law as it exists and that revising 
the law should be left to the legislature. In response to a juror who 
disagreed with the intent instructions and "resent[ ed] having these 
qualifications placed on my judgment," four of her colleagues 
argued: 
Juror 2: That's an issue [to be settled] on a legislative basis rather 
than on juries and deliberations, and I still feel that you must work 
within the law . . .  it's entirely reason.able to change the law, but you 
must change it at the right place and at the right time, and not as it 
stands. 
Juror 5: . . .  I agree that you have to stand with what the law says, 
regardless of how you person.ally feel. 
Juror 6: So you have to buy the judge's [instructions], because he is 
theoretically interpreting the law. 
Juror 4: Yes, because we can't disagree with those instructions . . . .  
[W]e have to go by the charges, but if the charges are wrong, it's not 
[ours] to disagree with . . . 
Juror 2: I agree with what you're saying completely.269 
The Harris juries also demonstrate the downsides of both the 
literalist approach to statutory application that many jurors initially 
favor and the role of public values in statutory interpretation. The 
jurors who were most committed to quasi-mechanical law applica­
tion also tended to voice least often thoughts indicative of consider-
267. "But why is the jury, you individuals, brought in and asked to react . . .  if not to 
provide a human understanding . . . . It seems to me that the reason juries are used is because 
a law that's absolute can too easily be misused, and the human element of a jury adds some 
relativity to it." 'D:anscript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 14; id. at 16 ("[M]aking such a decision 
under the qualifications offered me by the judge really distorts and disillusions what my con­
ception of the purpose of the jury is."); id. at 17. 
268. See 'D:anscript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 14 (recording two jurors describing the jury's 
role as one of settling factual disputes and not to interpret or adjust the law). Harris Jury No. 
2 had a similar discussion: 
Juror 6: ['That is] a very rigid interpretation. 
Juror 2: But, that's the only, that's the only interpretation we can give it. 
Juror 4: Well, it's the only interpretation you can give it. 
Juror 2: No, it's the only interpretation. It's against the law! 
Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 23. Juror 2's approach is particularly interesting in light of 
the fact that his jury was given the quasi-nullification instruction that stated the law as merely 
"intended to be helpful to you in reaching a just and proper verdict." Juror 2 fits well Conley 
and O'Barr's description of "rule-oriented" litigants and judges. See CoNLEY & O'BARR, 
supra note 128, at 59. 
269. Transcript for Harris Jury No. 3, at 5-6 (fourth ellipsis in original); see id. at 11-12 
("[W]hatever you want to do to effect a change [in the law] is entirely up to you, but it all 
depends on whether or not you believe that the laws should be changed . . .  right here as 
we're discussing them or whether or not you think they should be affected through the 
legislature."). 
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ation of an individualized, careful judgment of the defendant's 
culpability. "[W]e are charged with really only one thing," one ju­
ror argued. "We are charged with applying the law that was given 
to us, by the judge, to this case . . . .  Did [the prosecution] meet the 
requirements of the law? If they did, the man's guilty . . . .  "210 For 
many - those who held strongly to the property norm and were 
given the general-intent instruction - the literalist approach coin­
cided with their personal view of Harris's culpability; that undoubt­
edly made them comfortable with the literalist, seemingly common­
sense applications. For others, especially those less guided toward 
conviction by the property norm or less toward acquittal by state­
of-mind concerns, their view that they should apply the law with 
little regard for context or consequences reduced the effort re­
quired to pursue a moral judgment. 
For those who most adamantly endorsed the property norm, es­
pecially if given the specific-intent instruction under which the case 
for acquittal was strong, the force of this public value led some to 
interpret law implausibly, verging on "nullifying" to achieve convic­
tion.271 Public-values analysis, for juries at least as much as for 
judges, can mean that the decisionmaker allows personal normative 
preferences to overcome stronger, more persuasive interpretations 
of statutes.272 
270. 'franscript for Harris Jury No. 8, at 24. 
271. The strongest example here is probably a member of Jury No. 2, which was given the 
specific-intent instruction and voted 4-2 for acquittal. This juror was so committed to the 
property norm that he denied property could ever be abandoned, and thus that the defendant 
could ever honestly assume that it was. Note here how this background value affects the 
juror's finding (or interpretation) of facts. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 8, 11-12, 
17-18 (Juror 2). That norm led him to mistaken understandings of the specific-intent rule, 
such as, " 'knowingly' simply means taking it . . .  with the knowledge that he was taking it, 
that he wasn't taking it by accident" Id. at 18. He responded to jurors who offered correct 
understandings of the specific-intent law with remarks such as, "[D]id he intend to pay the 
state for the bricks? . . .  He's guilty of not being better informed [that the bricks weren't 
abandoned]." The pattern of responses revealed an unwillingness - seen in a few other 
jurors, see, e.g., Transcript for Harris Jury No. 7, at 18 (Juror 6) - to accept a mens rea rule 
that required intent as to circumstance and result elements, a rule that would be insufficiently 
protective of private property. See Transcript for Harris Jury No. 2, at 17-18, 21-25 (Juror 2). 
272. In his discussion of public-values analysis, Eskridge asks: 
Is a public values approach a determinate or coherent approach to statutory interpreta­
tion? As deployed by the current Court it is not, and I am not optimistic that another 
group of nine Justices would do the analysis any more consistently or coherently. The 
upshot of this criticism is that the Justices have a great range of value choices to make 
under public values analysis, and that in tum raises a third question. Can the Court 
justify its value choices in all these cases? No. My analysis of the recent cases suggests 
that the Court's overall set of public values is biased in ways that are hard to justify. 
Eskridge, supra note 13, at 1062. Legal scholars' criticism� of judicial reasoning as improp­
erly value-laden are too numerous to mention. For two well-known examples from different 
perspectives, see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 
YALE LJ. 920 (1973); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEXAS 
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C. A Note on Jury Interpretation of Insanity Instructions 
1259 
As a final note of comparison to the Reed and Harris juries, we 
can look to existing studies of how juries interpret insanity instruc­
tions. By directly presenting the issue qf whether the defendant can 
be held morally responsible for his actions, insanity doctrine poses a 
more overtly substantive problem of application than the simple 
theft and possession statutes of Harris and Reed. Jurors must deter­
mine at what level the defendant knew what he was doing and what 
level of knowledge is required for culpability; they must decide 
whether he knew his act was wrong and what wrong means.273 
Under another formulation, they also may have to assess whether a 
"mental disease or defect" made him unable to "conform his con­
duct" to the law.274 None of the standard versions of the defense 
lends itself to a plain-language construction that a juror could 
mechanically apply without normative construction of the statutory 
terms and evaluation of the defendant.21s 
The Chicago Jury Project recorded the deliberations of a large 
set of mock juries that were given the insanity-plea case United 
States v. King.216 In that case, the defendant, who performed ade­
quately at his job during the time of his alleged crimes, pled insanity 
to charges that he had incestuous relations with his daughters over 
a period of years. Findings from these deliberations, drawn from 
Rita Simon's account of the study,277 reveal some now-familiar 
strategies and considerations by jurors. The King juries discussed 
the duties and limits implicit in the jury's institutional role. Like 
the Reed and Harris jurors who resisted computer-like judgment by 
L. REv. 693 (1976). For a different description of normative biases in judicial thinking, see 
Kimberle Crenshaw & Gary Peller, Reel Time/Real Justice, 70 DENY. U. L. REv. 283 (1993). 
273. See M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fmnelly 200, 211-12, 8 E;ng. Rep. 718, 723 (H.L. 
1843); PETER W. Low ET AL., THE TRIAL OF JoHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A CASE STUDY IN 
nm INSANITY DEFENSE 10-14 (1986); SIMON, supra note 91, at 20-24; see also FINKEL, supra 
note 9, at 280-81 (describing from empirical research how jurors seem to "construe" key legal 
concepts in insanity instructions, especially the word "know"). 
274. This requirement comes from the last clause of the Model Penal Code statement of 
the insanity defense, which combines components from M'Naghten with the "irresistible im­
pulse" test See MoDEL PENAL CooE § 4.01(1) (1985). 
275. In one sense, then, jurors' interpretations of these rules are less interesting, because 
we easily recognize that the rules call for substantive construction and moral judgment, just 
as we know jurors must create substantive meaning for broad standards such as reasonable­
ness. This article has focused on the simplest statutes, with the assumption that more com­
plex ones only increase and make more obvious the interpretive demands on juries. Still, the 
contrast is useful because insanity doctrine is a classic decision rule that overtly raises the 
judgment of culpability. 
276. King was taken from the actual trial transcript of United States v. King, No. 655-5 
(D.C. Cir. 1956); see SIMON, supra note 91, at 50-51. 
· 
277. See SIMON, supra note 91. 
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rote application, the King juries identified for themselves a judg­
mental role separate from rubber-stamping expert opinion on the 
defendant's sanity. One juror argued, "[W]e don't have to accept 
what [expert witnesses] say as truth and that is it. In other words, 
they would be deciding for us. We would not be deciding for our­
selves what is right in this particular case."278 Another added, 
"That is right, you don't need a jury if you are going to take two 
doctors' words and say that this man is insane. Why do you need a 
jury?"279 Though some expressed frustration at the psychiatrists' 
refusal to offer an opinion on the ultimate legal issue of insanity, 
the study found that jurors were not inclined to abdicate, in Simon's 
words, the jury's "responsibility to the court and the community" to 
make the :final legal judgment independently.280 
Deliberations also revealed a consistent tendency to consider 
the purposes of criminal law generally and the insanity rule in par­
ticular, as well as to assess the likely effect of any judgment on the 
defendant and on society.281 Although the facts of the case gave 
the defendant a relatively weak case, jurors generally tempered a 
presumably strong inclination to punish harshly with concerns 
about the effectiveness of treatment and the relative benefits of in­
carceration versus civil commitment for the defendant and soci­
ety.282 With regard to these concerns, deliberations frequently took 
a purposive tone, analogous to the purposive method of statutory 
interpretation offered by legal-process theorists to describe judicial 
practice.283 
This approach, however, led jurors to other purposes of criminal 
law, - specifically of the insanity defense - thereby partially 
diverted their focus on moral culpability. In addition to the 
character-based retributive theory of moral culpability, criminal law 
has long juggled the competing concerns of crime prevention and 
public safety through the goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.284 The insanity defense in particular raises this issue 
278. Id. at 164. 
279. Id. A third juror added, "If that is the case [i.e., that the jury had to endorse an 
expert's opinion], this case shouldn't ever have gone to a jury." Id. 
280. See id. at 169-70. 
281. See, e.g., id. at 170-74. 
282. See id. at 170-73. 
283. See generally EsKRID,GE, supra note 4, at 143-51 {discussing Hart and Sacks's purpo­
sive theory of statutory construction and emphasizing the considerable discretion remaining 
for courts that employ it). 
284. See Low ET AL, supra note 273, at 3-5 {discussing the difficulties created for the 
insanity defense by the competing purposes of criminal law); SINGER & GARDNER, supra 
note 26, at 87-122 (reviewing general justifications for criminal punishment). 
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for juries when, as in King, jurors are informed that a not-guilty-by­
reason-of-insanity verdict means automatic civil commitment for 
the defendant. Simon reported that "jurors claimed that they were 
seeking a verdict that would best prepare the defendant, his family, 
and the community for the day when the defendant would eventu­
ally return to society."285 Even after much deliberation, some ju­
rors were uncertain "which alternative, imprisonment or 
commitment, was more likely to secure the results they were most 
anxious to attain: rehabilitation for the accused and security for 
society and for the defendant's family."286 As one example, a juror 
who urged a not-guilty verdict argued: 
The law is not meant to punish, but it is meant to correct the situation. 
I mean we are not helping his family or him or society by putting him 
in a prison. The only possible way of helping him and his family and 
society is by putting him where he can be helped and that is in a 
mental institution.287 
Here again a conceptual difficulty in criminal law becomes a 
practical adjudication problem for juries. The general verdict com­
bines the decision about the defendant's culpability with one on the 
justification of civil commitment. This is seen in the common view 
of insanity as a decision between punishing, or at least incapacitat­
ing, the defendant criminally or civilly.288 This conflation of culpa­
bility and therapeutic concerns distracts jurors from the need first 
to assess the defendant's blameworthiness in light of his condition 
- a moral judgment guided by criminal law - and then to assess 
whether civil commitment is justified for medical reasons.289 
Despite such purposive concerns, however, deliberations did not 
reveal that jurors allowed those considerations to determine deci­
sions. More significant, the deliberations revealed a strong concern 
for an accurate adjudication of moral culpability and a verdict that 
285. SIMON, supra note 91, at 174. 
286. Id. at 171. 
287. Id. For additional transcriptions of juror deliberations on this issue and discussion, 
see id. at 171-74. 
288. See FLETCHER, supra note 29, at 540-41 (quoting Herbert Packer that the not-guilty­
by-reason-of-insanity verdict is "a direction to punish but not to punish criminally"). 
289. See id. (noting "[t]he common observation" that insanity merely "determine[s] 
whether the social response to the defendant's conduct (condition) is to be imprisonment or 
hospitalization," and arguing that this view "combine[s] incompatible issues" of blameworthi­
ness and propriety of civil commitment); see also FINKEL, supra note 9, at 286-88 (surveying 
scholarly criticism of insanity tests as insufficiently focused on moral judgment and overem­
phasizing medical symptoms); cf. Reform of the Federal Insanity Defense: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 390-91 
(1984) (statement of Professor Stephen J. Morse, University of Southern California) ( criticiz­
ing the prevailing insanity rules and debates as pushing "pseudomedicalizations" and creating 
"an aura of false precision"). 
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reflected the defendant's moral culpability. Most juries rejected the 
insanity plea and found the defendant guilty. But his mental disor­
der was sufficient to make jurors uncomfortable about equating 
him with the paradigm of the typical law-breaker, and thus uncom­
fortable with their limited verdict options. Simon observed: 
[Some jurors] seemed to be searching for a compromise between the 
two verdict alternatives provided by the law - guilty or not guilty by 
reason of insanity. They were unwilling to find the defendant not 
guilty by reason of insanity because they were too impressed both 
with the heinousness of the crime and with the rational, calculated 
manner in which, to their minds, the defendant carried it out. On the 
other hand, for almost the same reasons, they were uneasy about hav­
ing the defendant treated as an ordinary criminal. An ideal solution 
. . .  would have allowed them to find the defendant guilty, but in need 
of medical treatment.290 
Simon further observed that a few jurors had "not even a shadow of 
a doubt about his sanity. But most of the jurors saw and were af­
fected by a shadow. In the end, however, the shadow was not 
strong enough to relieve the defendant of his responsibility to 
society. "�91 
The conclusion that jurors maintain attention on the assessment 
of moral culpability finds support in subsequent studies of jury deci­
sions on insanity issues. Finkel conducted extensive studies with 
mock jurors in search of the rationales, or mental "constructs," that 
motivate verdicts in insanity cases. He identified two "high-order 
constructs" that jurors employed across a range of insanity cases 
and that explained most variations in the verdicts for those cases. 
Jurors most often employed either a "capacity" construct that fo­
cused on whether the defendant was capable of making responsible 
choices or. a "culpability" construct that assessed blameworthiness 
in light of the defendant's behavior before the criminal act.292 To­
gether, these intuitiv� approaches strongly indicated that lay citi­
zens view insanity as a moral question of responsibility and 
blameworthiness. Instructions based on different insanity tests pro­
duced little difference in verdict outcomes in Fink:el's studies.293 
That likely is a product of both the nature of the cases and the limi­
tations of the written rules. Insanity cases, even to lay citizens, are 
clearly decisions about moral culpability; criminal law has been un-
290. SThfoN, supra note 91, at 172. 
291. Id. at 175; see also id. at 177 ("(T]he data demonstrate that the jury recognizes the 
distinction between a clinical diagnosis and the application of a moral legal criterion, and that 
they understand it is the latter which they must use in deciding the case."). 
292. See FINKEL, supra note 9, at 288-91. 
293. See id. at 292-97. 
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successful in capturing a subtle, compelling, normative analysis in 
its insanity standards.294 Insanity rules are incapable of a plain­
meaning application. As a result, jurors interpret the indeterminate 
terms of such rules with help from available social norms that shape 
our shared notions of responsibility and blameworthiness. 
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A PRACTICAL REASONING MODEL OF 
JURY STATUTORY INTERPRETATION - AND hs 
IMPLICATIONS 
From the foregoing, we can summarize a tentative collection of 
interpretive tools and strategies that jurors employ to apply statutes 
and their use for judgments of culpability. Perhaps the most obvi­
ous - and to some, the most surprising - is jurors' inclination to 
turn first to a plain-meaning or literal interpretation of statutory 
language. Even the Reed jury, which eventually settled on an inter­
pretation more subtle and context-sensitive than the most common 
literal reading, began with several acknowledgements of the "letter 
of the law" and serious debate about whether the jury had anything 
further to discuss beyond it.295 The Harris juries largely adhered to 
interpretations that seemed to correspond to the plain meaning of 
the intent instructions, although that language contained such a fun­
damental ambiguity about the elements to which the mens rea re­
quirement applied that no single meaning is compelling.296 
Reed and Harris provide an interesting contrast in this respect. 
The Reed jury felt compelled by the defendant's capacity and cir­
cumstances to interpret the statute closely in search of a meaning 
for the mens rea term that reconciled with compelling justice con­
cerns. The Harris jurors mostly were much less inclined by their 
defendant's predicament and character to search beyond an ordi­
nary meaning for that term's content. They spent much of their 
time seeking to define plain meaning with regard to the term's 
reach - what elements required intent or knowledge. The Harris 
juries that departed from a more plausible reading did so primarily 
to serve a compelling public value - the property norm - that was 
the defining background notion of most deliberations, rather than 
to assess the defendant's culpability. More often, the property 
norm set the moral framework against which jurors evaluated 
294. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 929, 950 (discussing the limitations of criminal 
code drafting that prevent the drafting of rules to cover every fact scenari_o ). 
295. See supra text accompanying notes 189-96. 
296. See supra section IV.B. 
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Harris's actions - both his ends, taking the bricks, and his means, 
taking without asking - and implicitly his character. 
The juries in both cases considered their institutional role, which 
helped define the parameters of acceptable interpretive choices and 
situated the jury in relation to other actors - police, prosecutors, 
legislatures - in the justice system. Yet the consideration of insti­
tutional role cut different ways, depending on which role-concep­
tion was persuasive. The Reed jury ultimately used its antiformalist 
view of the jury to prompt its close textual interpretation. The Har­
ris juries that raised the issue largely concluded that they were obli­
gated to seek an ordinary meanll!g for terms and avoid law reform 
or result-oriented application. This general inclination to follow or­
dinary meaning and attempt to apply it objectively corroborates the 
:findings discussed in the earlier review of empirical jury studies.297 
Several studies found juries generally applying instructions uncon­
troversially except where we would expect otherwise: in close 
cases,298 when given a strong nullification instruction in a morally 
compelling case,299 when fact patterns varied widely from prototyp­
ical ones - for example, euthanasia prosecuted as murder - or 
297. See supra text accompanying notes 96-120 & 160-81. It is also in accord with findings 
that people obey and enforce the law unless they have substantial disrespect for it. See, e.g., 
LIND & TYLER, supra note 204; ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 121 (identifying respect 
for the law as an important factor in determining how likely one is to obey the law); ToM 
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY nm LAW (1990). Most historical patterns of jury nullification 
occur when communities broadly oppose a given law, such as the Fugitive Slave Act, Prohibi­
tion statutes, or civil rights laws. See generally Brown, supra note 12. 
Drawing a lesson from Reed, we might note that jurors are affected not only by how much 
they respect the statute as a general, substantive rule, but also how they respect the law as 
applied in this case, or more precisely, the legal officials and institutions - the police officer 
or prosecutor - who decided to apply the law and initiate the case. Some Reed jurors disre­
spected that judgment, allowing them to struggle more easily with an interpretation of the 
statute that would match their instincts of situational justice. See Frontline: Inside the Jury 
Room, supra note 1. This no doubt connects with 'fyler's procedural justice points as well: 
the Reed jurors thought that the overall justice process here was flawed, though the flaws 
resulted from discretionary judgments by the prosecutor and police rather than from any 
procedural structure. See Frontline: Inside the Jury Room, supra note 1. 
298. Recall Kalven and Zeisel's confirmation of their "liberation hypothesis," finding 
that when plausible constructions of the facts could support multiple verdict options, jurors 
may give more weight to norms and values. See KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 164-66. 
For descriptions of comparable decisionmaking behavior by judges, see CARP & RowLAND, 
supra note 104 (finding, in fill empirical study of federal judges' attitudes and values, that 
such factors affect decisions mostly in close cases); ROBERT SALTER, DoINo JUSTICE 63-79 
(1991) (noting, in a first-person account by a judge of how he and other judges decide cases, 
that in close cases or when statutes are ambiguous or conflicting, judges are guided by their 
values and personal senses of justice - especially trial judges, who know the parties and the 
real-life implications of cases). 
299. But see Horowitz, Impact, supra note 94, at 452 (concluding that jurors could be 
effectively coached into adopting a strict or literal application with a clear argument against 
nullification power). 
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when the ordinary meaning of instructions conflicted strongly with 
widely held social norms.3oo 
Reed is an example of a jury compelled, by the ill-fit of the stat­
ute to the facts, to explore explicitly considerations and interpretive 
strategies beyond apparent plain meaning and rote application. 
The Harris juries are probably a better example of common prac­
tice, but even there we saw the inevitable attention to - or simply 
effect of - considerations familiar from judicial interpretation. Ju­
ries took at least a brief account of statutory purpose, social norms, 
and concern about the final justice of the outcome. Finally, we saw 
jurors consider occasional instrumental concerns, such as the incen­
tive effects of decisions on prosecutors and on other would-be crim­
inal actors, and the effect of decisions on social institutions like 
property rights.301 Both the Reed and Harris cases exhibited the 
distinct effect of social norms or public values, which supports other 
:findings of the effect of norms or values on jury legal interpretation, 
such as Finkel's findings of concern about proportional 
punishment. 302 
Despite the wide-ranging interpretive inquiry that this account 
implies, the common-sense meaning of the statute remained the 
touchstone for both the Reed jury and the Harris jury. Other con­
cerns often motivated reassessment of statutory terms rather than 
rejection of them. This study suggests that juries, like judges, rely 
on ordinary meaning - as in Harris - once it is constructed. If the 
factual story that jurors have constructed fits the statute well and 
does not conflict with strongly felt considered judgments about the 
justice of the outcome, then the language of the statute will seem 
clear and incontrovertible to the jurors and they will consider little 
else.303 This approach is even more likely when juries take a lim­
ited view of their institutional authority. 
300. See supra section III.B.2 (discussing Fmkel's and Kalven and Zeisel's findings); 
supra section III.D.1 (discussing Smith's studies); supra section III.D.2 (discussing Green­
wald's and Horowitz's studies). 
301. Recall the Supreme Court's repeated references to the jury's function as a check on 
prosecutors, judges, and arbitrary governmental power. See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 
U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 539 (1975); Johnson v. Louisiana, 
406 U.S. 356, 373 (1972). . . 
302. See the discussion of Fmkel's studies, supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text, 
and Robinson and Darley's survey, supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text. 
303. This conclusion finds support in Hans and Vidmar's account of a juror who describes 
the constraint she and fellow jurors felt in the statutory language contained in the judge's 
charge, despite their sympathy for the defendant's actions. See HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 
9, at 156-57. 
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Further, the reasoning process by which juries weighed these 
competing considerations is largely captured by existing accounts of 
judicial practical reasoning. We saw from cognitive science studies 
that juries interpret facts as a story within background knowledge 
that includes normative assumptions. Studies of nonlawyers' rea­
soning styles in court revealed a division between those aiming for 
rule-bound, deductive approaches and those with a more contextual 
orientation grounded in social norms. From these insights plus the 
examination of the Reed and Harris juries, we find that jurors often 
test a preliminary sense of the statute's application and case out­
come against the range of competing concerns that help evaluate 
both the accuracy of the legal interpretation and the justice of the 
result. While some jurors strive for a more rote, deductive ap­
proach to statute application, we see they are as vulnerable to criti­
cism as judges who claim to apply plain meaning. The Harris jurors 
who urged literal application nevertheless had to choose implicitly 
the extent to which the intent requirement applied, and they typi­
cally did so informed by a strong commitment to the property norm 
or a sense of the proper culpability judgment for the defendant. In 
short, as practical-reasoning analyses find with respect to judges, 
the facts of the case - the story jurors construct - and the norms 
it implicates affect either the willingness of a jury to depart from its 
implicit presumption for literal statute application or how it will de-· 
termine that "plain meaning" in the first place. 
Through the examples of deliberations in these two cases, we 
also see the necessity of practical reasoning to a criminal law with a 
normative conception of guilt. The criminal adjudication, seeking a 
judgment on the defendant's character and the moral quality of his 
conduct, requires attention to the context and circumstance sur­
rounding his actions as well as the law's application. Many of the 
factors that juries use to prompt more creative readings of statutes 
are precisely the sorts of concerns that criminal law demands. 
Checking rote application of ordinary meaning against social 
norms, public values, and context-specific facts is not only permissi­
ble, it implicitly is required by the nature of criminal judgment. 
Given the nature of criminal adjudication, as well as the preva­
lence and acceptance · of judicial decisionmaking characterized by 
practical reasoning, this study suggests that the basis for many tradi­
tional criticisms of the jury is wrong. Typically, juries are criticized 
for not applying statutes literally.304 Yet if practical reasoning is 
304. A related concern is that juries do not understand statutes, an issue addressed supra, 
section III.D.1. 
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widely practiced by courts and is inevitable, as its advocates suggest, 
and if verdicts are particularized normative judgments of culpabil­
ity, we perhaps should worry instead that juries feel too bound by 
the apparent plain meaning of statutes and limited conceptions of 
their role. That concern is corroborated by studies of lay judges 
and litigants, who are often more rule-bound and literalist than ex­
perienced judges with legal training.305 We have noted that juries 
generally are inclined to apply statutes literally; it may be this incli­
nation - and the limited view of the jury's role that it implies -
that leads some jurors to give the normative component of the cul­
pability judgment insufficient attention and seriousness. Given the 
documented tendency of juries to approach their task with good 
faith, and to attempt to check jury members who stray from their 
apparent mandate, literalism that discounts moral evaluation seems 
a risk of equal magnitude to that of jurors ignoring the law in favor 
of idiosyncratic preferences. 
Even though we have left law application to the jury, we incon­
gruously have conceived of it, for the jury only, as a rote, uncreative 
process. Juries are sometimes misled by that view. This article, in 
contrast, has argued that law application, even for juries, is a com­
plex, normative process. That conclusion has implications for jury 
instructions. In addition to the well-known problems of jury in­
structions - written in overly complex language, presented only 
orally at the end of trial - we might worry also at how little gui­
dance instructions usually give jurors for statutory construction. 
'fypically, juries receive virtually no help, save a command to take 
the law as the judge gives it and apply it without sympathy or inter­
pretation.306 What guidance they do glean from such advice likely 
encourages static, literal application, which we should now view as 
problematic. We find in traditional instructions the stereotypical 
assumptions that juries are at great risk of giving in to sympathy or 
emotion and must be constantly urged to follow the law. Studies of 
jury decisionmaking - and lay legal reasoning generally - now 
305. Conley and O'Barr raise the same possibility from their study of small-claims court 
judges, some of whom are lawyers and others of whom have no legal training. See supra text 
accompanying notes 133-39. They found one judge, who was not a lawyer and had less judi­
cial experience than most judges they observed, who was a "strict adherent" and viewed the 
law as an inflexible set of rules he was compelled to apply. In contrast, another judge who 
had a law degree and was characterized as an "authoritative decision maker" typically ex­
plained his rulings in terms of his personal opinions rather than legal rules. Conley and 
O'Barr concluded from their study "that lack of legal training and experience correlate with 
the tendency to displace responsibility for decisions onto rules that are beyond the control of 
the decisionmaker. Such judges lack the legal acumen and resulting confidence to take more 
personal and creative approaches." CoNLEY & O'BARR, supra note 128, at 110. 
306. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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are bringing us ·close to the point at which we should begin rewrit­
ing jury instructions based on assumptions with better foundations. 
If juries in fact frequently interpret statutes in an effort to achieve a 
more perfect judgment than mechanical application would yield, it 
is not due to the preparation or assistance they receive from the 
court system. The moral nature of criminal judgment, in particular, 
implies that we should urge attention to more than literal statute 
application. We should consider, in effect, canons of construction 
that would be useful and manageable for juries, canons that better 
serve the_ normative evaluation of guilt contained in criminal 
verdicts. 
An attempt to redesign ins'trudtions so as to aid juries' interpre­
tive efforts seems at least as likely as existing practice to facilitate 
satisfactory resolutions to' the inevitable' tensions - felt by jurors, 
litigants, and observers - that come from adjudicating moral judg­
ments about varied instances of human conduct under the guidance 
of general rules. Judges and justice theorists have long recognized 
the need and virtue of judges' ability to mediate application of rules 
with case-specific "considered judgments" and an acquired "situa­
tion sense." Juries, charged with resolving cases that no other pro­
cess has been able to resolve, face the same need. Instructions that 
acknowledge and aid the task of interpretation instead of ignoring it 
may help. 
The acknowledgement that juries must interpret statutes 
changes the premise of much discussion about how the jury per­
forms its job. The issue is no longer whether the jury "followed" 
the law or departed from it, because creative, dynamic interpreta­
tion is at times necessary, desirable, and inevitable. The question is 
the jury's competency at such interpretation. Evidence indicates 
that they accomplish the task in much the same way, with much the 
same effect, as judges. 
